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The argument of this paper is that the two main principles of nationality law used by nation 
states are not designed to handle the possible scenario of states sinking due to climate change. 
With the consequence of its habitants having to seek haven elsewhere, the focus is to illustrate 
how the application of the principles ius soli and ius sanguinis stand in relation to the universal 
human right to a nationality in the event of a state becoming uninhabitable and/or physically 
extinct. The aim is to highlight the flaws inherent in the reading of the principles due to a 
neglect both of the complex intertwining of the nation states and human rights and due to an 
understanding of territory as spatially relative. Such aim originates from the notion that the 
international legal order ought to become more well-adapted to the climate changes ahead for 
the universal legal rights to remain purposive. Since the principles are established as 
customary law within the international community, a number of case studies such as the Bikini 
Atoll and the Swedish Alien Act are presented in order to describe their practical 
(in)applicability. Inevitably, when discussing potential future scenarios the examination also 
has to entail a degree of hypothetical reasoning. Such reasoning will here find its bearings in 
the underlying impetuses of the principles and the concepts permeating them. Theoretically, 
this paper is inspired by post-structural reasoning arguing that the current interpretation of 
the two principles are imbued with an implicit understanding of nation states as physically 
omnipresent and independent of their habitants. The paper contends that such unreflexive 
Westphalian interpretation and application of nationality law principles risks leading to 
climatic statelessness and unavoidable violations of rights claimed to be universal. This leads 
to the conclusion that international law and the understanding of its subjects, simply put, needs 
to become more environmentally sustainable and reconstructed to fit a world which is 
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Chapter One: The Extinction of Nations and Nationhood – 
Introduction to the Thesis 
 
1.1. Introduction 
Imagine a world where everyone is tearing on Earth in the exact same amount. Someone might 
drive more, someone might eat more, but at the end of the day their carbon footprints are 
exactly the same. If something were to happen to the climate of that world, it would be 
everyone’s equally heavy burden to carry. If one corner of the Earth was to become 
uninhabitable it would indeed be bothersome and sad for those forced to move, but in the world 
you are imagining now everyone is equal. Therefore, those on the move would be entitled to 
settle down anywhere they want due to the inalienable human sameness which endures in the 
collective. Surely the weathers, environments and temperatures are diverse in different areas. 
Perhaps even alterations in traditions and languages have evolved due to the far distances 
between them. Nevertheless, one is always considered a part of the whole more than an 
exclusive member of a small part. Consequently, you would never have to think twice of where 
to go next if nature had its way and forced you on the move. The laws in place to generate 
commonality and order are also of course supporting everyone’s equal right to belong. Thus, 
those happening to live in the areas more prone to be affected by climate changes induced by 
how everyone proportionately has been driving, producing, shopping, travelling and eating are 
in no danger. Their rights as human beings are as maintained on high altitudes as they are on 
lower ones. 
 
Now let us return to this world. The rationales from the imaginary one may be argued to exist 
here, but the reality tells a different and to some extent even opposite story. Although there are 
human rights supporting the notion of everyone’s equality, people are treated differently. As 
will be emphasised throughout this paper, people cannot expect to become members of a 
society with reference to their bare humanity. Moreover, while bigger and richer states are 
contributing with the largest proportion of the pollutions affecting the climate, the smaller and 
poorer states are the ones threatened by the consequences (WWF, 2020). And as seas are rising, 
winds are changing and crops are burning as results of climate change, human beings are 
experiencing their homes turning not only less recognisable but also less inhabitable. In 2018, 
the predominantly American Indian habitants of Isle de Jean Charles became the first 
community in the US to be federally sanctioned and moved due to ‘climigration’ as the region 
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quickly sinks into the Gulf of Mexico (Matthews, 2019). In 2014, the state of Kiribati bought 
eight square miles of land of Vanua Levu to use as insurance-territory in case the climate forces 
Kiribatians on the move. Papua New Guinea has already begun the relocation of the Carteret 
Island population to its mainland since the group of low-lying atolls are beginning to disappear 
under the ocean surface (Keating, 2018). Current estimations show that entire populations 
could be forced away from the homes they once knew before the end of this century (ICCP, 
2014a; Park 2011). In academia and political forums, scholars and politicians now recurrently 
speak of ‘sinking states’, signalling that landmasses presently referred to as part of sovereign 
territories are changing their silhouettes and characteristics (McAdam, 2010; Alexander & 
Simon, 2014; Piguet, 2019). The concerns about what will happen to the populations of nation 
states becoming physically absent or uninhabitable occupies the minds of an increasing number 
of scholars, yet the answers remain few.  
 
Although many of those affected by climate change are not likely to be forced out of their 
domestic nation states, estimations by institutions and scholars indicate that millions of people 
will be (see e.g. IDMC, 2020; Piguet & Laczko, 2014). The migration of the latter will occur 
in an international society where rights of individuals have been finely knitted together with 
the manifestation of physical landmasses in the form of nation states (O’Manique, 1990; Reus-
Smith, 2001). ‘International society’ is here not understood in a strictly Hedley Bullian sense. 
Instead, I use it to describe an order comprised of all agents such as individuals, nation states, 
organisations, companies and so forth (cf. Bull, 1977). I am concerned with the uncertainties 
regarding what legal condition individuals will find themselves in when the territorial land of 
theirs has vanished. Does existing international law give room for claims to abstract state 
affiliations so that peoples’ right to a nationality can be upheld? Without a habitable domestic 
state left to assert their belonging to, will they be considered stateless and thus rightless? Will 
these people be dependent upon other nation states granting them new nationalities? These are 
questions already raised in the ongoing discussion among international legal scholars, but my 
attempt here is to introduce a new layer to the discussion. By putting the nationality law 
principles ius soli and ius sanguinis (sometimes referred to as ‘jus soli’ and ‘jus sanguinis’) 
under the loupe; which so far has not been done in the climagration discussion, this paper is 
devoted to make an exploratory and transdisciplinary dive into these queries. Part of this 
exploration seeks to illustrate how the principles (dys)function in practice when applied to the 
specific situation of migration due to climate change-induced uninhabitability. This is done in 
order to expose that the principles are formed in dissonance to the right to nationality 
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established in the Universal Declaration of the Human Rights (UDHR). Another interrelated 
part seeks to elucidate the underlying problematiques within the concept of nationality itself, 
drawing back to its very foundation. This necessitates an investigation of mainstream notions 
of concepts such as the nation state, sovereignty, human rights and their relevance to the 
nationality law principles of focus.  
 
What I seek to put on display here is an exploratory junction from both a state perspective and 
an individual rights perspective where the very centre is argued to be loaded with 
jurisprudential contradictions. Thus, to ‘uphold’ one’s nationality as formulated in the title of 
this paper concerns both states’ attempts to uphold the concept of nationality as a proof of 
affiliation and individuals’ attempts to uphold their right to a nation state belonging. The paper 
is not an attempt to apply a praxeological lens and advance from what could be politically 
possible to implement in international legal sources. Rather, it is an effort to highlight 
contradictions between current nationality-determining principles, human rights and the future 
of nation states in a changing climate. A reader looking for easy and achievable solutions to 
the challenges surrounding climatic statelessness may therefore become frustrated. A reader 
interested in an alternative interpretation to why statelessness is and is likely to remain a 
perplexing issue in international law may be less so. I contend that it is on this theoretical 
meadow one is able to fully critique, assess and ultimately imagine an alternative path or 
change to the status quo. Thus, it is on field I will remain. Instead of focusing the attention 
towards neo-conservative and exclusionary politics which repeatedly have broken promises of 
universal human rights, I attempt to direct the attention to the physicality of states. The focal 
point concerns the potential room in international law to uphold the right to a nationality when 
that physicality is crumbling.  
 
1.2. Purpose and contribution 
As stated in the introduction, the aim is to initiate a critical examination of ius soli and ius 
sanguinis in light of the upcoming global challenge of states becoming uninhabitable. A 
prerequisite in order to achieve such aim is to introduce the two main legal principles of 
granting nationality and concepts related to them to the discussion of climatic statelessness. 
The paper could be said to consist of several research questions in place to achieve the higher 
analytical purpose:  
- Which concepts intertwined with ius soli and ius sanguinis may be of significance in 
the discussion of climatic statelessness and in what ways?   
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- In what ways do the principles become troublesome from both the individual rights 
perspective and the state perspective in an era of sinking states? 
- How could the spatial relativity of nation states’ territories affect the applicability of 
the nationality law principles?  
 
The research questions are not numbered nor answered in a chronological order in the paper. 
This is because I consider them to be overlapping rather than separate. To clarify to the reader 
why they are posed and how they are relevant to the thesis, it may nevertheless be of value to 
explain their importance. The first of these questions is addressed in order to situate the 
principles in a wider context and illustrate their relevance in a debate which is both rights- and 
climate-related. By illustrating what concepts and structures are interconnected with the 
principles of focus, an analysis beyond a legal dogmatic reading of them becomes feasible. The 
second question allows me to present to the reader the multi-layered dysfunctionality of the 
principles. One such layer is the substantial clash between territorial particularity versus 
universal rights, which to a large extent also has been touched upon scholars before me (see 
e.g. Reus-Smith, 2001; Donnelly, 2007; Arendt, 1951/2017). Another layer is the centrality of 
territory in the form of inhabitable land in order for the principles to function at all. The third 
question allows me to present not only an analysis rooted in actual events and case studies, but 
to make a more conceptual exploration of territorial physicality and the importance it has to 
nationality law and the human right to nationality. Altogether, the questions are related to the 
research purpose in the way they allow me to introduce, dissect and examine principles that 
are often addressed in the nationality debate. By answering them, it becomes visible that such 
debate ought to incorporate considerations of the role of climate change in relation to 
statelessness. 
 
I remain humble in my attempt of making these queries. The reason for this modesty is the 
current lack of discussions surrounding ius soli and ius sanguinis in the specific case of climatic 
statelessness. Whilst the principles have been discussed extensively in issues relating to 
statelessness as we currently know it (as a result of for example wars, denaturalisation and law 
gaps) they have remained unmentioned in recent years’ reports and writings about the ‘future’ 
kind of statelessness directly related to climate change. As the principles nevertheless remain 
the foundational pillars of nationality law, I underline the centrality of putting them under the 
loupe. By analysing their applicability to the situation of there being vanished, sunken or 
uninhabitable states, the purpose here is to dig deeper into the issue of climatic statelessness 
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and the legal instruments affecting its being or non-being. The bottom of that deep is here 
argued to reach down to the very foundational ideas of what a territorial nation state is, consists 
of and the freedom it has to adopt its own nationality law principles. This argument further 
stems from the conviction that legal principles constructed within a ‘mainstream order’ 
composed of physical and inhabitable nation states ought to be re-examined when such order 
is being re-shaped.  
 
Nationality is a legal concept, and I want to increase the knowledge of that concept and what 
it could turn people into if they have to climagrate. As such, the paper may primarily be of 
interest to legal scholars. However, my hope is that this discussion can contribute with a new 
layer within the debates already being held and invite other disciplines to the conversation. The 
layer I offer would indeed depart from the very basis of the enquiries surrounding nationality 
already established, namely the right to it and the legal and political loopholes depriving 
individuals of it. However, the potential contribution of this paper is the way it knits previous 
discussions together with a conversation about the nation state as a physical entity and thus the 
status of ‘belonging’ to it as something deeply intertwined with the idea of something highly 
material. This conversation is inspired by a post-structuralist thought where I am committed to 
bring up for discussion a transdisciplinary reading of concepts such as sovereignty, human 
rights and nationality in a changing climate.  
 
1.3. Delimitations 
As emphasised by David Owen (2018) the discussion concerning the right to have rights raised 
by Hannah Arendt already in 1951 is by no means superseded. This may be elucidated through 
the growing body of academic work and political focus on statelessness, but also through the 
large number of stateless individuals there are globally (UNHCR, 2020). Yet, this further 
means that delimitations ought to be made in order for a concrete and clear enough argument 
to be presented within the scope of this thesis.  
 
In light of its purpose, one such delimitation is therefore the light sweep rather than deep dig 
into the matter of naturalisation. This delimitation was made in order to keep the argumentation 
focused on nationality law and the abstractions resting within it. As the aim of this paper is to 
evaluate the principles of ius soli and ius sanguinis, the cultural, highly politicised and 
subjective naturalisation process is largely left out of the discussion. However, this should in 
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no way be understood as a neglect of its importance. Nor does this mean that the paper holds 
the principles to be objective and non-political. Instead, the stance in this paper is the entire 
opposite. Naturalisation is indeed believed to be a fundamental part to the issue of statelessness, 
and as will be touched upon in the paper; the principles are considered to be deeply socially 
assembled. Although the paper adheres to a transdisciplinary approach and understanding of 
law, the naturalisation process is simply too diverse and complex to fit within the narrative told 
here. Thus, leaving naturalisation out of the discussion should be understood as merely a choice 
of attention.  
 
Another active choice of delimitation is the focus on the right to nationality as found in article 
15 of the UDHR. As will be underlined throughout, this right cannot in practice be detached 
from other human rights as nationality is often the enabler for access to other rights (Arendt, 
1951/2017; Kingston 2013). It is arguably also the close connection between the right to 
nationality and other rights claimed to be universal and inalienable which makes discussions 
about statelessness worth having. Yet, as the focus here is to critically examine the assumptions 
permeating the concept ‘nation state’ and the legal principles of allowing or disallowing 
affiliation to it, it is article 15 which has here been deemed the most relevant to scrutinise. 
Another reason to why UDHR is used as the main reference is because that was where the right 
to a nationality was first proclaimed. It is the foundation for subsequent international covenants 
which too refer to a right to nationality, and it provides one of the more extensive descriptions 
of the right among currently existing international sources of normative documents (e.g. 
Giustiniani, 2016; Piguet, 2019). This does not mean that other sources are irrelevant and they 
will to some extent be touched upon. Nevertheless, as the paper is an attempt to interpret the 
socially constructed core of the right to nationality rather than applying a formal dogmatic 
approach, it has been deemed excessive to dive deep into every source mentioning the right. 
 
A choice has further been made to mainly refer to sea level rise as the consequence of climate 
change likely to make states uninhabitable. Yet, sea level rise can be detached from other 
effects of climate change just as little as the right to a nationality can be detached from other 
rights. Thus, this is obviously an ill-fitting delimitation to make if one seeks to illustrate the 
full spectra of climate change likely to affect the habitability of the earth (ICCP, 2014a; ICCP 
2015b). However, the rising sea level is currently the most demonstrable effect there is of 
climate change and global warming (McAdam, 2010; Tabucanon, 2014; ICCP 2015b). 
Therefore, it is arguably a well-suited delimitation if one attempts to make a clear and concise 
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argument. Since my intended audiences are those who seek to critically engage in the studies 
of international law and human rights rather than experts of geoscience, I hope I am forgiven 
by the latter for making this demarcation. As I will attempt to illustrate, the notions of 
statehood, rights, nationality and the omnipresent physical state are deeply rooted and highly 
complex. Adding all the complexities of climate change to the mixture risks leading to a too 
difficult argument to comprehend.  
 
1.4. Theoretical considerations 
Before proceeding to the central argumentation of the thesis, it may be of value for the reader 
to make acquaintance with the theoretical considerations and analytical lenses used to approach 
the topic. Although this is a master thesis in international law, there is little to no legal dogma 
applied in order to make sense of the right to a nationality and the deprivation of it. Instead, I 
apply a post-structural lens where I consider law inseparable from other disciplines. With an 
educational background of both law and international relations, I find myself in a position 
where I cannot isolate my own knowledge and experiences into separate disciplines. 
Consequently, both due to the choice of theoretical perspectives and my own experiences, the 
paper seeks to be transdisciplinary. In the first chapter of the paper, such an approach may 
become particularly visible as it constitutes an amalgam of disciplines discussing concepts 
related to nationality.  
 
The thesis draws inspiration from a variation of scholars. I keep the work of Hannah Arendt as 
a theoretical inspiration close although she is not generally defined as a post-structural scholar. 
This is because I consider her to provide an abundant account of statelessness. Through her 
work The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951/2017), she brought light to its existence and 
established many of the foundational arguments in the still ongoing debate. One such argument 
is that nationality is the right one needs in order to access other rights. Another interlinked 
argument is that we assume that equality is produced through humans organising, meaning that 
those alienated and excluded from the group are left out in the wilderness of inequality (see 
e.g. Owen, 2018). Regarding the construction of human rights, the nation state and the 
‘morality’ believed to be found within it, Christian Reus-Smith’s (1997; 2001) notion of 
constitutional structures has for a long time motivated my continuous exploration of the right 
to a nationality. The constitutional structures are assemblages of intersubjective principles, 
norms and beliefs which do not only outline ‘morality’ or rightful action but also define what 
a legitimate actor with privileges and rights of its own is. Reading Arendt and Reus-Smith 
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together has steered my approach to the question of statelessness into an exploration of concept 
construction. I have found the post-structural critique to offer useful postulations in such 
investigation. Michel Foucault’s reading of power and knowledge illustrates how the 
continuous production and reproduction of powers and orders can lead to a sense of human 
rights being part of our molecular genetics (Foucault, 1976/2008a; 1997/2008b). The way he 
considers the bodies of individuals as extensions of the sovereign’s body in Discipline and 
Punish further inspires me to question what happens when the body of the nation state vanishes 
(1975/2020). The sense of physicality of certain concepts is also highlighted by Félix Guattari, 
whose work The Three Ecologies (1989/2000) has motivated this interweavement of the right 
to a nationality and climate-induced extinction of states. Guattari considers the social-, mental- 
and environmental ecologies interconnected. According to him, they are not only affected by 
objective pollution but also by the passivity and incomprehension stemming from inherent 
flaws in the order. The view that a reordering and remodelling of our understandings may allow 
for a space of change is thus useful from both an environmental- and rights perspective:  
It is up to the protagonists of social liberation to remodel the theoretical 
references so as to illuminate a possible escape route out of contemporary 
history, which is more nightmarish than ever. It is not only species that are 
becoming extinct but also the words, phrases, and gestures of human solidarity. 
A stifling cloak of silence has been thrown over the emancipatory struggles of 
women, and of the new proletariat: the unemployed, the 'marginalized', 
immigrants (Guattari, 1989/2000:43-44). 
Employing a post-structural theorising of the powers involved to make human rightless while 
nation states disappear may help illustrate why and how the nationality law principles used by 
nation states indeed function more nightmarish than ever. More than bringing light to issues of 
the order, these theoretical considerations also suggest that changes of the status quo are 
possible. While my explicit aim is not to suggest a praxeological solution, there is an 
emancipatory interest inherent in the thesis. Therefore, this theoretical project can be placed 
under the umbrella of critical legal studies.  
 
1.5. The research 
1.5.1. Positioning in relation to previous academic work 
Much of the existing scholarly work on the issue of climatic migration has aimed its attention 
towards ‘the climate refugee’. The discussions have taken on both rights-based-, security- and 
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responsibility approaches and circulated around a number of questions relating to definitions, 
regulations and policy responses (see e.g. Biermann & Boas, 2010; Piguet, et. al, 2011; Faist 
et. al, 2013, Zetter & Morrisey, 2014; Albrecht & Plewa, 2015; Behrman et. al, 2018;). Despite 
receiving an increased attention, these questions are in no way solved and outdated. Instead, 
the debate of how to prepare and handle a world in which humans migrate in larger quantities 
than ever before continues. Scholars remain divided on how to form any international legal 
instrument to solve such situation. Some consider new legal regimes, some argue for extensions 
of already existing international conventions and others are stressing that a new international 
treaty would be deeply inappropriate and problematic (see e.g. Hsiao, 2017; Bier & Boas, 2010; 
McAdam, 2012; Eckersley, 2015). While some scholars stress differences on the individual 
level among refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), environmental migrants and 
stateless, others are looking at the broader and arguably more abstract perspectives of power 
relations and environmental (im)mobility (see e.g. Piguet, 2019; Zetter & Morrisey, 2014).  
 
This being said, I am by no means the first to emphasise climatic statelessness as an issue in 
international law. Owing to these forerunners, there is a possibility to continue digging where 
they have already begun and to scrutinise other parts of international law which remain 
unmentioned. The principles of ius soli and ius sanguinis are far from unknown in the ongoing 
debate on statelessness in general (see e.g. Edwards & Van Waas, 2014; De Groot & Vonk, 
2018). Yet, if one considers climatic statelessness as a particular form of statelessness bringing 
light to other construction errors of the international legal regime then much ground to critically 
explore the principles remains untouched. ‘Untouched’ or ‘uncharted’ is moreover fitting 
adjectives explaining statelessness and how it is currently treated in international- law and 
relations. There is no term such as ‘statelessness law’ in use. The scholars nevertheless 
emphasising its importance are fighting an uphill battle against quick-fix-seekers. Although the 
academic archives on statelessness grow, so does the number of stateless in the world (Edwards 
& Van Waas, 2014). Additionally, since climatic statelessness is a ‘future’ large-scale issue 
academics have had to allocate much space and time explaining it as something even worth 
focusing on (see e.g. McAdam, 2010; Alexander & Simon, 2014; Albrect & Plewa, 2015; 
Piguet, 2019). To some degree, I also find it necessary to do so in this paper. The first chapter 




1.5.2. Method(s) of the research 
In light of the theoretical considerations described above and with the aim to fulfil the outlined 
purpose, it is now time to declare a few things concerning the research resulting in this paper. 
To put it in conventional wordings, one could say that several theoretical methods are deployed 
here but to different degrees. Bearing in mind the unprecedented situation of large-scale 
climatic statelessness, the empirical material to establish one’s reasoning upon is scarce. The 
nationality law principles in question here have simply not been fully put to the practical test 
of handling populations seeking refuge due to uninhabitable nation states yet. If empirical 
theory is understood as an apparatus of practice description, then there are however examples 
on which hypotheses can be built. These examples constitute both case studies of climate-
related migration and national applications of ius soli and ius sanguinis in more general terms. 
Furthermore, the paper entails several reports on climate change from International Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC). That being said, there is an evident lack of case law regarding ius soli, 
ius sanguinis and sinking states combined. Therefore, the method of this paper has not been to 
dig into court records archives. Instead, the futurity aspect of the issue has allowed more room 
for normative and constructive theories to form the method. Normative theory is here 
understood as theory giving attentiveness to what ought to be and the justifications for it. A 
clear normative element in this thesis concerns the right to a nationality, sovereignty and the 
depiction of statelessness as improper. In contrast, constructive theories are concerned with the 
potential of the current and coming order of things. Due to a critique of the status quo being 
inherent in the thesis, constructive theory is arguably the bearing wall of this entire research 
project. Yet, this conventional division between empirical, normative and constructive theory 
is something I have now used for the sake of clarification more than anything else. The material 
used and words read have in fact been approached with an understanding of these theories as 
overlapping and even intertwined. As expressed by Bernhard Peters (1994), I understand legal 
norms as creating a type of symbolic and intentional social order. Such order in turn establishes 
substantive actions and merits; procedural legitimacy, acceptance, calculations of who and 
what is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ and so on. This is usually what is considered part of an empirical 
analysis. Both norms and practice are continuously produced and reproduced through social 
constructions; we think, speak, act, bargain, influence, agree and resist more or less consciously 
to maintain or change what is and what is to become. In other words, I see the stubborn 
separations of normative, empirical and constructive theories as aspirations to tell the story 
from different angles. Paradoxically, in the attempt of making things clearer the story may then 
end up further away from what is ‘real’. Therefore, in the attempt to anchor this which some 
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might refer to as a ‘theoretical investigation’ in the ‘real world’, a blend of methods has been 
used to tell the story from multiple angles. This goes hand in hand with a post-structuralist 
approach, in which the foundational stance is that one cannot and should not attempt to make 
sense of the world from a one-way-street of (see e.g. Guattari, 1989/2000).  
 
This means that ius soli and ius sanguinis are perceived as socially and normative constructed 
parts of a dynamic order. The historical, political and legal establishment of the nation state is 
here argued to permeate that order. Thus, in the analysis of the nationality law principles a 
method of conceptual interpretation has been used; not solely of the principles themselves but 
also of concepts relating to them such as human rights, sovereignty, nationality and 
statelessness. Consequently, the research method cannot be distinguished as solely focusing on 
either the state perspective or the individual rights perspective. Instead, the issue has been 
approached from both perspectives in order to locate its critical junction. The method of 
analysing an issue from diverse angles has been inspired by Didier Bigo’s (2002; 2018) usage 
of the Möbius strip. Bigo uses the strip as a metaphor of (in)security. Accordingly, the Möbius 
strip which lacks an explicit outside and inside illustrates how someone’s insecurity may be 
another’s security. These opposing views are illustrated by the fact that depending on from 
which angle one observes a Möbius strip, it will seem as if it indeed has an inside and an 
outside. However, an observer from an opposing side of the strip will perceive the sides in an 
inverted way. Similarly, I use the Möbius strip metaphor to understand rights(less). This 
method of interpretation makes the ‘nation state perspective’ and the ‘individual rights 
perspective’ fundamentally interconnected in a system where the rights of the nation states 
could make individuals rightless and vice versa. Therefore, it becomes necessary to not limit 
the analysis to one of the two perspectives.   
 
Since I claim to make a transdisciplinary reading, the meaning of this asserted method should 
too be clarified. In line with a post-structural reasoning, bodies, minds and environments cannot 
be understood in isolation from each other (Guattari, 1989/2000). However, the mainstream 
separation of subjects into numerous academic disciplines suggests the opposite. In accordance 
to the conventional division, this paper can be said to consist of material from disciplines such 
as law, history, philosophy, ethics, anthropology, environmental research, international 
relations, policy, political theory, development studies, geography and so on. Using a 
transdisciplinary approach means that no clear divide between these disciplines is upheld and 
that they are all regarded relevant to the thesis; although it is formally and traditionally defined 
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as a thesis in law. Hence, transdisciplinary research is here understood as reaching beyond the 
mainstream division of disciplines. It is the attempt to form an inclusive sphere of 
understanding where the idea of separable knowledge from ‘diverse disciplines’ is not 
supported. This is different to for example interdisciplinary research and multidisciplinary 
research, where the former seeks to incorporate knowledge from multiple disciplines and the 
latter is formed by people from multiple disciplines. (see e.g. Baaz, Lilja & Vinthagen, 2018).  
 
1.5.3. The process of researching 
It is now time to highlight how the process of research and writing has looked. To begin with, 
the literature searches have been made during September, October, November and December 
2020 in the University of Gothenburg’s library. Parts of the material also come from previously 
collected material in 2018 and 2019 from King’s College London’s university library. The 
databases used to find the articles referenced to have been JSTOR, HeinOnline, Cambridge 
Journals Online, Routledge Handbooks, Oxford Handbooks, Springer Ebook Collection, 
United Nations Digital Library, United Nations Treaty Collection, World Bank Data and JP 
Student Migration. The material primarily consists of articles written in English which have 
been published in internationally recognised journals. Although searches in the library 
collections have been made in both English and Swedish, material in the latter language proved 
to be very scarce. Therefore, the absolute majority of the sources used are in English.  
 
I have used a number of keywords in the search for sources. These words can be found in an 
appendix at the end of the paper. They have been used in different combinations and with 
supplementing and relevant free-text terms. The keywords were initially gathered from reading 
Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951/2017), Etienne Piguet’s article 
“Climatic Statelessness: Risk Assessment and Policy Options” (2019) in Population and 
Development Review and Heather Alexander’s and Jonathan Simon’s article “Sinking into 
statelessness” (2014) in Tilburg Law Review. Synonyms to these keywords have also been 
searched. Search results regarding climate change and climatic migration have been limited to 
sources from the last ten years, as the topicality of climate change research has been deemed 
to be of importance. Other searches concerning for example concepts and philosophical 
interpretations have not been limited when it comes to publication dates. This is because I 




This process of research and finding material should be understood in light of the method(s) 
and theoretical tools previously underlined. Before commencing the research, I had formed an 
idea of the research question and what type of lens I preferred to look through when answering 
it. I acknowledge that with other keywords included in the searches, another analytical lens 
applied and by concentrating on other concepts, the answer to these research questions could 
look very different than those I provide.  
 
1.5.4. Objectivity  
The aim of the paper is to debunk inherent flaws in nationality law, which necessitates a 
comment relating to that of objectivity. I consider objectivity in itself as something produced 
by agents who think, speak and construct it. Michel Foucault’s power-knowledge nexus may 
illustrate how objectivity and facts are understood here. ‘Truth’ is seen as something assembled 
not merely through active and conscious choices but through processes of power which in turn 
permeate our understandings of the world; how it was, is and should become. In this sense, the 
object of study and the subject studying it becomes inseparable. Consequently, not only the 
legal scholar but law itself is continuously re-produced within the current order which in turn 
establishes the ‘becoming-order’. Both the legal material and methods used in any so-called 
jurisprudential reasoning is thus a result of the spatiotemporal positionings of agents and the 
multiple power structures forming their ideas of what should be (1976/2008a). Hence, I believe 
the closest one may come to objectivity in its mainstream sense is to acknowledge one’s own 
positioning and attempt to be transparent about the assumptions made. Thus, I want to state 
early on that I do not seek for a ‘true’ or objective law. On the contrary, this paper is an attempt 
to disentangle legal principles which are often unreflexively used and referenced to as if they 
were endlessly true. While doing so, I remain an agent within a system filled with postulations 
unavoidably brought into this paper. The wish that all individuals should be treated equally and 
a sense of ‘fairness’ as being desirable permeates me as a human being and legal scholar. Yet, 
I try to keep in mind Freidrich Nietzsche’s words “[o]bjectivity and justice have nothing to do 
with one another” (1897/1997:136). Calling oneself objective would according to him be to 
reproduce an ethical superiority camouflaged as historical analysis. This makes me reluctant 
to categorise this as a project of objective investigation, and suggest that the reader instead 




1.5.5. Practical and jurisprudential relevance 
A critic may find this thesis too abstract and theoretical; building on an analysis insufficiently 
rooted in the world we call ‘real’. However, an underlying assumption is that we are constantly 
constructing and reconstructing theoretical concepts within that real world such as ‘nation’, 
‘states’ and ‘nationality’; thus making theory and reality interconnected (see e.g. Guattari, 
2000). Accordingly, this type of theoretical investigation does not equal practical irrelevance. 
In the words of Cass Sunstein, “[l]aw is a normative enterprise; it is inevitably philosophical. 
For this reason, the distinction between legal theory and legal practice is at most one of degree” 
(1995:267).  
 
This brings me to another question, which concerns the jurisprudential relevance of this Master 
of Laws dissertation. Firstly, I wish to underline that the method observed here suggests that 
explorations outside of traditional legal dogmatic reasoning of for example historical and 
political accounts are not problematic. In reference to what previously has been stated, such 
crossings of discipline-borders may in fact even lead to a more comprehensive illustration of a 
legal issue. Secondly, the thesis is legal at heart. The emphasis on the right to a nationality, the 
rightless position of the stateless, the nationality law principles and the sovereign right to apply 
them all consists of both a legal reasoning and a legal language. It is a type of legal 
argumentation which will perhaps not find support in current court rooms, but that is not my 
ambition either. As formulated by Filip Hassellind (2017), it is knowledge about law rather 
than knowledge in law which I am concerned with here. Going back to Sunstein’s account, the 
difference between these two fields of knowledge is perhaps not as solid as is sometimes 
suggested. Regardless, by making a distinction between them I hope that even those perceiving 
law mainly as a craftsmanship can see the relevance in this type of legal analysis. 
 
This being said, I contend that the relevance of the thesis is not limited to legal practitioners 
and scholars. It is also a contribution of knowledge which may be of value to other disciplines 
and parties, such as human rights activists, politicians and academics in fields such as asylum, 
human development and migration. As I will seek to elucidate throughout the paper, nationality 





Although the paper has an overarching aim and multiple research questions to meet the 
objective, it is not structured to answer the research questions in a chronological order. Instead, 
the paper is divided into four chapters which together create the analytical spectra imperative 
to see the bigger picture I seek to sketch out. Therefore, after this introductory chapter the paper 
continues with what I refer to as a legal and conceptual departure. It is named as such since the 
chapter contains clarifications of great importance for the proceeding argumentation. The 
reader is first introduced to the construction of the nation state and I explain how I consider it 
to be fundamentally intertwined with human rights. The human right of focus within this paper 
on statelessness being the right to a nationality is then described as well as the principles in 
place to ensure individuals this right: ius soli and ius sanguinis. Subsequently, the puzzling 
situation of statelessness is underlined. Hence, already at an early stage of the analysis the 
principles are suggested to function in dissonance to the human right to nationality due to the 
construction of the nation state itself. The reader also becomes familiar with the ‘new’ or 
‘future’ type of statelessness emerging, namely climatic statelessness.  
 
The third chapter begins with a presentation of climate change research stressing the likelihood 
of nation states becoming uninhabitable due to sea level rise. This is provided to the reader in 
order to underline that there is a great importance in theorising about the sinking state and 
climatic statelessness as a phenomenon. What follows is a discussion of whether or not a nation 
state without inhabitable land is likely to cease being a sovereign entity or not. This is done in 
order to explore if it really is an issue; in light of the right to a nationality of the nation state’s 
subjects, that some nation state may become physically extinct. The assumption in this paper 
is that territory being the ‘body’ of the nation state is fundamental to its survival in the way the 
notion of the nation state is currently designed. Therefore, it is further argued that the question 
of what happens to the sunken state’s habitants ought to be asked and explored. Consequently, 
the third and the forth chapter is knitted together and the latter proceeds to investigate how the 
principles of ius soli and ius sanguinis would function in a scenario of there being a nation 
state-no-more. The chapter begins by exemplifying the principles’ dysfunction in the case of 
the Bikini Atoll and the Swedish Alien Act. It then proceeds towards a post structural analysis 
of ‘territory’ itself, arguing that the environmental ecology of territory has been neglected in 
the construction of international law and the fundaments it rests upon. This is contended to 
become evident not only in the way the absence of answers in international law to the situation 
of physical relativity is exposed, but also in the way essential keys to human solidarity such as 
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the customary nationality law principles have been made entirely conditional upon the 
existence of soil. The paper concludes by suggesting that these dysfunctionalities of ius soli 
and ius sanguinis will become increasingly unsustainable as Earth is changing its silhouettes.  
 
 
Chapter Two: A Legal and Conceptual Departure 
 
2. Statehood and Statelessness in the International 
In this part of the paper I elaborate on the concepts upon which international law to a large 
degree rests upon, namely the nation state, sovereignty and human rights. These concepts are 
also central pillars in the conversations concerning nationality and the deprivation and/or denial 
of it which are central to the thesis. Consequently, the nationality law principles ius soli and 
ius sanguinis and the issue of statelessness will too be explored more closely. This conceptual 
departure is written with the conviction that history matters in the way it is connected to and 
undetachable from the present and future. In contrast to some other parts of the paper in which 
the recency of referenced material has been deemed significant, the subsections of this chapter 
are therefore a blend of material from not only different disciplines but also from different ages. 
Hence, the mixture of times and spaces found within this rather descriptive yet critical chapter 
is a conscious and sought-after outcome. Accordingly, the intention is not only to establish the 
foundation upon which the rest of the paper is built but also to illustrate international law’s 
intertwining with other disciplines and schools of thought.  
 
Another accentuation must be made before the discussion continues. It concerns the usage of 
the terms ‘state’ and ‘nation’. The often misused terminology suggesting that these are 
synonyms can be troublesome, and I do not intend to partake in the reproduction of the 
terminological hassle. Firstly, ‘state’ is defined in article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention. 
Although the convention is far from universally ratified, it is widely considered customary 
international law (McAdam 2010; Alexander & Simon, 2014). The article highlights four 
criteria to be fulfilled in order for “[…] a person of international law […]” to be considered a 
state. Those are a permanent population, a defined territory, a government and the capacity to 
enter into relations with other states. I will come back to these criteria later in the paper and 
explain what relevance they have to the thesis. Secondly, a ‘nation’ could instead be described 
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as something a state seeks to form. There is no legal definition of what a nation is. Rather than 
being defined by borders and political standing, nations are defined by social, historical and 
cultural criteria. As such, a nation is a social construction in which the group of people within 
it form a unity around for example religion, language, cultural practices and traditions, values 
and ethnic identity (Rejai & Enloe, 1969; Cambridge Dictionary 2020). Nations do not take 
into consideration state borders which in many cases were drawn long after these social 
constructions came into being. This ultimately means that nations can extend over several 
states, but also that nations can lack states completely. Examples of the latter are the Kurds, 
Palestine and Rohingya. Consequently, when one speaks of a ‘nation state’ this is to suggest 
that there exist a homogenous group of people forming a sovereign entity with a shared 
government within a specific territory. In reality, this is a rare phenomenon (Penn State, 2020). 
Nonetheless, as will be emphasised in the following paragraph the mix-match of the terms in 
international law and politics suggests that ‘nation state’ is the concept sought after and fixated 
with. Therefore, the term ‘nation state’ will be used to illustrate the legal idea and political 
archetype of the homogenous state. The term ‘state’ will occasionally be used for an ease of 
read and when the argument merely circulates around an autonomous territorial entity. 
 
2.1. The ‘nation state’ 
As the term international law implies, the current legal system governing the relation among 
nation states and their habitants is fundamentally based upon the premise that there are several 
self-determining bodies existing in a more or less symbiotic relationship. This sovereignty of 
nation states is arguably the grundnorm of the entire international community (Reus-Smith, 
2001). However, as emphasised by historian David Armitage (2013), from what we currently 
know of the history of human societies, nation states have been exceptions and empires the 
common rule when it comes to the governing over humans and territories. Furthermore, if we 
deem the era of empires to have ended through decolonisation and the borders of nation states 
beginning to blur as globalisation commenced the prime time of nation states lasted from 
approximately 1975 to 1989. Before and after, Armitage argues that the order has rather been 
pre- or post-national and nations have rarely if ever fitted within the borders of states. 
Nevertheless, the strong conviction of the importance and very real existence of the nation state 
seems to survive. In what follows, I attempt to illustrate how the concept of the nation state 
came into being and why it is so difficult to detach ourselves from it, although history suggests 
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that nation states are peculiarities. The argumentation is based upon the premise that we are in 
fact deeply intertwined with this concept; especially in our understanding of human rights.  
 
The perception of the nation state as the ruling entity is often argued to have existed since the 
Westphalian Peace in 1648, which is traditionally said to mark the ‘birth’ of the territorial state 
(Alexander & Simon, 2014). Prior to the peace of Westphalia, kings and emperors were 
considered to be in the possession of divine, natural rights to rule over the people. As science 
evolved, the conviction of God-given royal rights began to erode and political individualism 
started to grow. This eventually led to the formation of territorial states in which people claimed 
their right to govern and participate. Yet, the old and the new order were fundamentally 
interconnected in this process of change; neither occurred in a spatiotemporal vacuum nor were 
born out of a single event (see e.g. Foucault, 1997/2008b). Consequently, the emphasis on the 
rights of the individual and the strong belief in natural rights to govern merged, leading to the 
idea that individual rights were as natural as the rights previously held by kings and emperors. 
In other words, the calls by the masses too originated from the conviction that there were rights 
assigned to them which had to be respected. These rights became seen as inalienable and 
universal; part of what it meant to be a human (O’Manique, 1990). This also led to the state 
being defined as a society of many rather than the property of one, “[…] over whom no one 
but itself has the right to rule and dispose” as phrased by Immanuel Kant (1795/2005). In other 
words, the state became what E. H. Carr called a ‘group person’, or what Thomas Hobbes 
referred to as an ‘Artificial Man’ (Carr, 1939/2016; Hobbes 1651/2008). What they meant by 
this is that the state indeed now consisted of individuals with rights that the state was assigned 
to protect, but the state also possessed rights of its own. These rights remained very similar if 
not identical to what kings and emperors had before it, such as the right to rule, exist and defend 
itself. Yet, to make this ‘group person’ as effective as possible homogeneity became thought 
of as necessary. As argued by Patrick Thornberry (1989), this desire sprung out of the idea that 
the state would be more stable if the people it consisted of were culturally uniform. In other 
words, it was believed that the ‘nation state body’ would function better if all its cells (i.e. the 
humans it consisted of) were fitting parts of the figure and worked towards common goals. For 
this reason, the pursuit of the ‘nation state’ began. As emphasised by Armitage (2013), such a 
mission has been incongruous in the real world where such homogeneity is atypical. 
Nevertheless, the concept of the nation state is today still founded upon this hypothesised rights 
holder. It is the institutionalisation of what existed before it and nation states have been granted 
rights and duties as if they are living and breathing royalties. It is a hypothesis which also 
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remains effective as long as we believe in its existence (Carr, 1939/2016). As we still speak of 
for example the sovereign rights of states, the United Nations and every state’s duty to ensure 
their people their human rights, the concept of the nation state undoubtedly lives on (Alonso, 
1995). We also continue to blend the two concepts of ‘nation’ and ‘state’ together as one and 
it is now the foundation of what we call international law. Moreover, it is deeply knitted 
together with our understanding of human rights.  
 
2.2. The human rights doctrine  
Irrespective of any historical accounts suggesting that norms and understandings are 
evolutionary rather than born ex nihilo, human rights are sometimes and highly Western-
centred argued to have been established through UDHR. Although declarations in general are 
not legally binding, UDHR constitutes customary law according to many (see e.g. Hannum, 
1996; Government Offices of Sweden, 2008; Amnesty, 2020). As previously emphasised, for 
others its content is even considered natural (see e.g. Vincent, 1986; UDHR 1948). In contrast, 
there are those who consider UDHR to be merely an act of idealism or hubris (Posner, 2014). 
The aim of this paper is not to pick sides in such debate. The stance here is that attempts to 
establish one sole definition of what human rights are and exactly how and when they were 
established may even be problematic. The grounds of this position will be further explained in 
the following paragraph. What has been deemed to be of importance here is instead the level 
of consensus among agents and whether human rights can be considered norms within the 
international community regardless of what basis such norms rest upon. This is for obvious 
reasons difficult to measure, and the closest one may come in the attempt to quantify consensus 
might be the rather bland and problematic example of signatories. By a vote of 48 to zero and 
with eight abstaining voters, the UDHR was established in 1948. This is of course a small 
number of voters in comparison to the world’s total number of states. Yet, what has followed 
since is a large number of legally binding international conventions which has served to either 
expand, fill in the gaps or codify the content of UDHR. Together with the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the UDHR is part of what is now commonly referred to 
as The International Bill of Human Rights. The two covenants have over 170 signatories each, 
arguably illustrating some sort of consensus among nation state parties regarding the 
importance of UDHR (IJRC, 2018). As emphasised by Jack Donnelly (2007) there is also a 
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remarkably low number of nation states which have ever made serious claims that the UDHR 
does not apply to them, which further indicates the existence of a consensus.   
 
The understanding that ‘[h]uman rights are the rights that everyone has, and everyone equally, 
by virtue of their very humanity’ as phrased by Raymond John Vincent (1986:13) further 
illustrates how the existence of universal human rights have become somewhat of an axiom. 
This is not only the case in international law and among states, but possibly also in the 
international society of individuals. That is at least the case for those who like Vincent assume 
that rights are retained by human beings due to their nature as humans. This is an assumption 
essentially grounded upon the notion that natural rights exist; an assumption which I described 
above as having both historical, sociocultural and religious ancestries. However, even those 
denying the existence of natural rights have by now a difficult time to downright disregard the 
significance of the human rights doctrine. While one reason for that could be of moral and/or 
selfish nature, another could be due to the extensive codification; human rights are now to a 
large extent positive law. To illustrate, the claim in article 1 of the UDHR stating that ‘[a]ll 
human beings are born [my emphasis] free and equal in dignity and rights’ is fundamentally 
based upon the conviction that there is a natural universality and inalienability among human 
beings which should and can be sustained (UNGA, 1948). States’ obligations to promote, 
respect and observe these rights and freedoms are further recognised in the preambles of both 
ICCPR and ICESCR. Thus, making a clear distinction between natural human rights and 
positive human rights may no longer be possible. This is, to come back from an earlier 
statement, why any distinction between positive and natural human rights will not be upheld 
here.  
 
Instead, these are here considered two sides of the same coin where neither sufficiently can 
explain the existence of rights considered to be human. Because while the international 
community of naturalists and positivists, liberals and realists, altruists and egoists continuously 
emphasise the importance of adhering to human rights, they are repeatedly challenged by the 
uncomfortable reality of constant violations. Furthermore, changes in perceptions of what is 
and what is not a human right tell the tale about how the human ‘nature’ is in fact socially 
constructed (Donnelly, 1984). One of the most prominent examples of this could be slavery, 
which went from being widely accepted to become a jus cogens crime and considered to be 
one of the gravest human rights violations to exist (OHCHR, 2002; UDHR 1949). Although 
slavery still exists in somewhat altered forms, the conversion of acceptance regarding slavery 
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cannot be satisfactorily explained by solely referring to universality and/or human nature. 
Instead, what is and what is not a human right seems to be deeply dependent on agencies within 
societies and the spatiotemporal positionings and trajectories of the subjects who define, admit, 
adhere to or challenge what is and what is not conceived as a human right (Golder, 2015). 
Another example of how human rights should be understood as social constructions is the right 
to a nationality, which will be discussed in the following.  
 
2.3. The entitlement to belong 
2.3.1. Nationality and citizenship – an unfortunate amalgamation 
Before proceeding to a discussion regarding the right to nationality, it may be of importance to 
clarify another terminological hassle. That is the difference between ‘nationality’ and 
‘citizenship’; two complex concepts which tend to become even more complicated by the fact 
that they sometimes are used haphazardly and as if they were synonyms (see for example 
UNHCR, 2005; Türk, 2014). ‘Nationality’ refers to the membership of a nation state. How one 
acquires it depends on the nation state in question and what principles it applies; principles 
which I will come back to and explore in closer detail soon. Although defined as a right in 
article 15 of UDHR, the meaning of nationality per se has no legal definition. When it comes 
to citizenship, there is no right to it nor definition of the term within international law. However, 
national legislations usually define it (see e.g. 1 § lag om svenskt medborgarskap, SFS 
2001:82). It is generally understood as a narrower concept than nationality, and it does not 
necessarily accompany the latter.. For example, there are nations in which citizenship is 
received on one’s eighteenth birthday whilst nationality is received at birth (e.g. Mexico). Yet, 
citizenship too represents a legal connection between the individual and a state in the way it 
establishes rights and responsibilities (The Economist, 2017). Whilst nationality as a status 
derives directly from the social construction of the nation state as a homogenous entity, 
citizenship could instead be explained as a political crowning of an individual to participate in 
the society; it represents the full membership to a state. Accordingly, rights not declared as 
universal but nevertheless extensively recognised such as for example the rights to vote or run 
for office are usually granted to those holding citizenship. Yet, as argued by Katherine Tonkiss 
(2017) the reason why these two different concepts tend to be used interchangeably is because 
we hold on to the social construction of the nation state. Thus, we presume that national 
citizenship is the one way to be a citizen, and thus nationality has become what the UDHR 




A problem one encounters when exploring the literature on statelessness and the concepts of 
citizenship and nationality is that the interchangeable use of the concepts has been widely 
replicated and unquestioned (see e.g. Blitz & Lynch, 2011; Belton, 2011; Kingston, 2013). 
This perplexing reproduction and inaccurate use of the concepts has been highlighted by 
scholars for decades yet it continues (see e.g. Scott, 1930). Thus, when contributing to the 
scholarly collection a declaration of one’s positioning is in order. While I agree with Tonkiss 
(2017) when she calls for a reflexive problematisation of nationality as a socially constructed 
concept, I will not yet take her advice to abandon the term altogether. It will be used in this 
paper as it seeks to make a dive into the current system of international law and the 
constructions within it. That system is still frequently referring to nationality, connects it with 
citizenship and is built to fit the notion of a nation state. That being said, I support arguments 
calling an end to performances and reproductions of the ‘national citizenship’. A post-national 
approach to memberships and rights could arguably be the way to end statelessness, which is 
the underlying impetus here (Habermas, 1995; Agamben, 2000: Tonkiss, 2017). Therefore, 
usage of the term ‘nationality’ made throughout this paper should not be understood as an 
acceptance of the status quo. Instead, it should be regarded as an illustration of the enduring 
and problematic centrality of nationality and the nation state in international law. That being 
said, references will henceforth primarily be made to nationality and not citizenship, as it is the 
former which is presumed to create a mare’s nest of the entitlement of to belong. 
 
2.3.2. The right to a nationality 
Article 15 of the UDHR states that ‘[e]veryone has the right to a nationality’ (UNGA, 1948) 
and is in literal terms dependent upon the existence of nation states to belong to. Hitherto, this 
paper has attempted to demonstrate that the existence of such a nation state is a historical 
product and thus relative rather than an omnipresent fact. Hence, one could call the right to a 
nationality another social assemblage. This means that the right to a nationality did not appear 
nor exists in isolation but is intertwined with the emergence of the nation state as we currently 
understand it and continuously reproduce it. Such comprehension is further illustrated by the 
United Nations Charter, in which article 1(2) asserts that the purpose of the UN is “[t]o develop 
friendly relations among nations [emphasis added] based on the respect for the principle of 
equal rights and self-determination of peoples [emphasis added]…” (UN, 1945). The article 
formally accentuates the deep connection still believed to exist between the nation state as an 
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entity and the people within it, which is ultimately also demonstrated on an individual level 
through the claim to a nationality as a human right.  
 
On an every-day basis, it is important to be able to prove one’s nationality and/or having one 
when for example travelling, seeking asylum, contacting official authorities, open bank 
accounts and even so seemingly ordinary things such as signing a mobile phone contract or 
effortlessly collecting parcels from the post office (see e.g. Asylrättscentrum, 2020; 
Kommerskollegium, 2020; McAdam 2010). Thus, the ability to identify one’s belonging is 
important for many reasons and what makes the right to nationality particularly remarkable is 
how it seems to open up the door to access virtually all other human rights (Arendt, 1951/2017; 
Owen, 2018). This argument goes hand in hand with the idea that the nation state is the insurer 
of rights and that the rights themselves were born out of it. Hence, belonging to a nation state 
becomes crucial for individuals (O’Manique, 1990; Reus-Smith, 2001). Despite this, 
remarkably few international legal documents make reference to the right to a nationality. To 
illustrate, the content of some of the core human rights instruments will be highlighted here. 
To begin with, ICCPR article 24(3) asserts every child’s right to a nationality but mentions 
nothing about the right for adults. The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) reiterates 
this by underlining birth registration in article 7 as a central element in the right to acquire a 
nationality. Yet, as illustrated in article 8 of CRC states are obliged to respect the right for 
children to preserve their nationality. Nothing is mentioned regarding states’ duties to provide 
for it. To continue, ICESCR, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) and the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) remain completely silent on the matter. Article 5(d)(iii) of the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) does mention 
states’ responsibilities to guarantee without discrimination the enjoyment of the right to a 
nationality. However, Article 1(3) underlines how nothing in ICERD affects state parties’ 
freedom to implement their own legal provisions concerning naturalisation, citizenship or 
nationality. Accordingly, nation states are not obliged to grant all claimants nationalities but 
they are obliged to not discriminate in such process. Article 18 of the Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) establishes disabled peoples’ right to not arbitrarily be 
deprived of their nationality and obliges states to recognise their right to one, but there are no 
mentions of any concession duties. Article 9 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) underlines that states are obliged to offer the 
same right to acquire, change or preserve nationality to women as they offer men. However, it 
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is not clearly defined anywhere the obligations states have towards the latter. Thus, what may 
be concluded by this brief exposure is that there is little guidance in international conventions 
how the universal right to a nationality should be guaranteed by states or demanded by 
individuals. Instead, the legal mechanism existing to ensure that the right to nationality is 
upheld takes the form of principles.  
 
2.4. Principles of nationality law 
Despite the widely recognised importance of the right to a nationality, international law 
contains no universal doctrine of granting nationality to individuals. Instead, nation states 
remain free to choose among a limited amount of nationality law principles which one they 
want to adhere to. This includes the freedom to alter which principle to adhere to through time, 
combine principles and to alter which ones to apply depending on the type of situation (de 
Groot, 2006; Van Waas, 2007). Such self-determination is the basis of the entire nation state 
society, but has also been codified in numerous international conventions. For example, article 
1 of the 1930 Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws 
states that ‘[i]t is for each State to determine under its own laws who are its nationals […]’. 
Article 2 states that ‘[a]ny question as to whether a person possesses the nationality of a 
particular State shall be determined in accordance with the law of the State’. The custom is to 
permeate such laws with nationality law principles. 
 
In this section of the paper, the two principles ius soli and ius sanguinis will be examined. 
Together with naturalisation and the marriage principle ius matrimonii, they constitute the body 
of principles which is commonly referred to as nationality law (De Vincentiis, 2019). 
Nationality law is central to a number of other areas of both international- and domestic law 
such as migration law, human rights law and social law. However, nationality law is also 
central to the question of the rule of law itself, since it establishes who is and who is not an 
agent within the domestic legal system (see e.g. Edwards & Van Waas, 2014). This makes 
knowledge about the principles of nationality law essential. Despite this great importance and 
impact of nationality law on both nation states and individuals, neither ius soli nor ius sanguinis 
are codified in any international legal instruments. Instead, they have been formed out of 
English common law (ius soli) and the Napoleonic Code (ius sanguinis) and have spread across 
the globe to become custom among states (Bauböck et. al., 2018). Because ius soli and ius 
sanguinis are fundamentally tied to the territorial state of origin and are currently the most 
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common principles used among nation states, the attention is given to these two principles 
solely.  
 
A problem with these principles is that they too have been born out of the interlocking of 
citizenship and nationality. This has led to an academic bewilderment where the principles are 
sometimes argued to establish the nationality of individuals and sometimes their citizenship 
(see e.g. De Groot, G-R. & Vonk, O., 2018; Owen, D., 2018; Solodoch, O. & Sommer, U., 
2020). Arguably, the great ambiguity regarding what exactly ius soli and ius sanguinis 
determine is a veracious demonstration of the ongoing conceptual inferno. Perhaps due to this, 
the principles are best understood as granting either and both. What I mean by this is that since 
national citizenship is the prevailing form of citizenship, even those who non-reflexively argue 
that nationality law principles determine citizenship rights are in fact also referring to 
nationality (see also Tonkiss, 2017). Owing to this argument, the remainder of this paper will 
assume and speak of nationality law principles as determinants for nationality.   
 
2.4.1. Ius soli & ius sanguinis – a synopsis 
Ius soli translates to ‘right of the soil’ and is a principle of nationality law which grants 
nationality to those born within the borders of the state. The principle was the general standard 
in Europe until the beginning of the nineteenth century and its origin dates back to the creation 
of early modern European states. Consequently, ius soli was and remains fundamentally 
interconnected with notions of the nation state and its sovereignty (Perelló, 2018). However, 
during and after the French revolution the exclusivity of ius soli became increasingly 
challenged and a new principle called ius sanguinis emerged. Ius sanguinis translates to ‘right 
of blood’, meaning that nationality is inherited to a child from either one or both of its parents 
depending on the national application of the principle (Van Waas, 2007). The principle was 
born out of the idea that not merely the place of birth but one’s social, cultural and economic 
ties to the nation state are of importance in the distribution of nationality. Furthermore, this 
legal evolution occurred in an intellectual space and time where several disciplines based their 
reasoning on biological theory. Thus, it was arguably unsurprising that a nationality principle 
accentuating biological features would evolve and ius sanguinis came to mean that the 
territorial background of one’s parents became central for those requesting to be considered 
French. From the initial discussions of the Constitution in 1799 to the enactment of the French 
Civil Code in 1804, ius sanguinis eventually became the dominant feature of nationality law 
in the French legal system. Other Western societies too began to adopt the principle in the 
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following years of the century, elucidating how the revolution’s rationales regarding nation 
state belonging were not limited to France exclusively (Perelló, 2018). While most of the states 
in the Americas still adhere to ius soli, ius sanguinis is the dominant principle in Europe (Vink 
& de Groot, 2012). However, as will be emphasised below, maintaining a dichotomous 
categorisation between the two principles may no longer be an accurate reflection of reality. 
 
2.4.2. A legal concoction of soli-sanguinis 
It has become increasingly common by nation states to not adhere solely to one of the two 
principles mentioned above but to combine them. As a result, different principles may apply to 
different types of situations and/or additional requirements have been added to the mixture. 
Ultimately this tends to complicate the realisation of the right to a nationality, which arguably 
may be the objective behind constructing such legal concoctions to begin with. For example, 
some nation states adopting ius soli as a general rule have now also introduced requirements 
necessitating parents to have particular immigration statuses in order for their children to gain 
nationality. Similarly, there are nation states who commonly adopt ius sanguinis which have 
restricted children’s right to gain nationality if their parents are assumed to lack a ‘genuine’ 
connection to the state (Van Waas, 2007). The criterion of such genuine connection and thus 
the confirmation of it as a lawful prerequisite has been established in case law by the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Nottebohm case (Liechtenstein v Guatemala, 1955). 
In the following chapters, I will discuss further how these mixed usages of the principles 
become particularly troublesome in the case of climatic statelessness. 
 
Changes in adherence and applications of the principles may not always happen overnight, but 
political oscillations have recently been proven capable of challenging the status quo in 
unpredictable and somewhat hasty manners. A recent example of this is the 45th US President 
Donald Trump announcing in 2018 that he was considering changing the first section of the 
14th Amendment in the US Constitution in order to end ius soli in the United States. While his 
quest to change the Constitution lacked legal basis it did have enough political capital to create 
a legal controversy out of something previously considered a settled dispute (Mirelli, 2018; 
Reuters, 2019). Although legal scholars dismissed Trump’s proclamation at the time, it 
eventually led to the commencement of a US Department of Justice project in early 2020 to 
withdraw certain US (national) citizenships. While the project is officially said to target serious 
criminals, the lines are blurry and the room for interpretation extensive when it comes to 
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individuals in risk of being targeted (Prasad, 2020). Another example is Portugal’s amendments 
to its nationality laws in mid 2020. The changes make it easier for some groups to receive 
Portuguese nationality than previously was the case. These groups include spouses, 
grandchildren and non-married partners of Portuguese citizens (Homel, 2020). Thus, 
nationality laws are changing in several nation states and cross-national differences remain. As 
highlighted by Chiara Strozzi in a report for IZA World of Labor (2017) there is no general 
convergence towards a more restrictive or liberal approach by nation states in their legal 
designs. What exists is rather a global mix-match of interpretations of the principles with added 
prerequisites. 
 
The result of this becomes manifold. On one hand, it limits nation states’ responsibilities to 
grant nationality to those not meeting the requirements built into their legislations and added 
to their interpretations of soli/sanguinis. On the other hand, as nation states continuously 
change their nationality laws it creates a complex situation of unpredictability and 
uncertainness among those seeking to claim their right to nationality. Ultimately, individuals 
risk finding themselves in a cul-de-sac where nationality is not granted to them by anyone 
(Tobin, 2015). In such an event, individuals may find themselves in a situation defined as 
statelessness. 
 
2.5. Statelessness  
2.5.1. The historical evolvement of statelessness 
Article 1(1) of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons defines a stateless 
person as ‘a person who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its 
law’. Historically, people have found themselves in the situation of statelessness as a result of 
for example the rejection of particular populations by nation states, conflict of laws or 
administrative failures (Piguet, 2019). According to UNHCR (2006), it is often a bewildering 
blend of political, legal, technical and administrative ingredients which makes a person 
stateless. It is also regularly defined as a root cause of obstacles to human development and 
further human rights violations (see also UNHCR 2005; 2011; 2020a). In light of the right to a 
nationality in article 15 of UDHR and the International Bill of Human Rights, the phenomenon 
of statelessness may seem perplexing. Yet, if adding a critical evaluation of concepts such as 
the nation state and human rights to the discussion perhaps statelessness becomes more of a 
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foreseeable phenomenon; something affecting many of those who are not considered a part of 
the homogenous majority.  
 
If the concepts of the nation state and human rights illustrated above seem too abstract and 
intangible to make sense of, Arendt puts them into a context perhaps more clarifying and 
concrete. In her work The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951/2017), she illustrates how 
decolonisation and the world wars leading to the creation of new nation states and changing 
borders have given rise to minorities in areas where cultural uniformity simply does not exist. 
Due to the quest for homogeneity within the nation state these minorities have needed 
additional legal protection to be able to somewhat safely exist within nation state societies. 
This is inconsistent to the idea that there are universal and inalienable rights. Additional 
protection should not be necessary if such rights were granted to everyone automatically. 
Additionally, Arendt underlines that the new minority treaties established following the First 
World War only applied to newly created nation states. In the older Western nation states the 
Westphalian heritage and the Rights of Man persisted. There, human rights had been 
intertwined with the construction of the nation state as illustrated above. This led to a situation 
where ‘[…] no authority was invoked for their establishment; Man himself was their source as 
well as their ultimate goal. No special law, moreover, was deemed necessary to protect them 
because all laws were supposed to rest upon them’ (p. 380). This meant that no additional 
protection was established for minorities in already independent nation states; some of them 
who also stood in the foreground of the establishment of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the United Nations. The argument was that minorities were supposed to already 
have rights due to the fact that they were human. In other words, in historically powerful 
Western states it was believed that the human rights doctrine did not need any protection- nor 
enforcement mechanisms. There, everyone was guaranteed their rights as the humans they were 
(Reus-Smith, 2001).   
 
However, the nationality laws principles applied by nation states have proven to challenge 
these assumptions profoundly. To draw from what has previously been discussed, the French 
revolution and the development of ius sanguinis is a fitting example of how the subjective 
elements in the construction of human rights remained neglected and led to a space for 
exceptions. During and after the revolution, ius sanguinis came to mean that individuals having 
no apparent connection by neither birth nor parents could gain a French nationality just by 
living in France for a period of time. Yet, in accordance to the spirits of the revolution this 
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exception primarily applied to outstanding scholars or leaders such as for example George 
Washington, Thomas Payne and Jeremy Bentham (Perelló, 2018). The space of exception also 
meant that there were those starting to fall between the chairs; there were those who did not 
meet the new criteria nor were considered prominent enough to be admitted as members of the 
nation state. Thus, the number of individuals lacking a nationality began to grow as nation 
states started to adopt ius sanguinis. Although the source of statelessness arguably lies at the 
very heart of the construction of nation states, Carlos Perelló (2018) uses the ius sanguinis rule 
to illustrate how subjective and relative nationality is. It is a legal way for nation states, now 
regardless of their age and power, to create statelessness and deprive people of rights by 
referencing to their own right to choose nationality law principles and consequently also pick 
and choose who may or may not belong to them.  
 
2.5.2. Statelessness today 
There are currently two sources of international law focusing primarily on statelessness. In 
addition to defining what a stateless person is, the 1954 Convention on the Status of Stateless 
Persons seeks to establish a set of minimum standards which stateless people ought to be 
ensured. The 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness is an international mechanism 
in place to guarantee that individuals’ right to a nationality is respected. It is the source which 
established the right of every child to gain a nationality at birth if it otherwise would be 
stateless, which has been reiterated in CRC and ICCPR. Furthermore, it requires states to 
establish a number of safeguards in their own nationality laws in order to prevent statelessness 
from growing (UNHCR, 2020b). Paradoxically, article 8(3) of the 1961 Convention also allows 
states to deprive individuals of their nationality if the individuals are disloyal towards the nation 
state. This for example includes scenarios where an individual has contributed with services to 
another state which is forbidden according to the nation state’s laws, or if the individual has 
acted in ways which are harmful to the vital interests of the nation state. What these vital 
interests are remains vague and is subject to national interpretation. Hence, the 1961 
Convention underlines the persisting centrality of nation states’ interest and limits their 
responsibilities by ensuring them a right to adopt national laws with room for both 
interpretations and exceptions (Edwards & Van Waas, 2014). Henceforth, I will refer to the 
1954 Convention and the 1961 Convention collectively as ‘the Statelessness Conventions’. The 
establishment of these conventions further mark the differentiation between a stateless person 
and a refugee, with the latter being defined in the 1951 Refugee Convention. The parting of 
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‘refugee’ and ‘stateless’ is a central moment in the international reaction to statelessness. 
Whilst refugees became considered an acute issue, statelessness became an issue to handle 
long-term (Edwards & Van Waas, 2014). This is still the case. The number of parties of each 
Statelessness Convention remains below 50 % of the total number of UN member states and 
the right to a nationality remains ambiguous (see UNHCR 2020b). Furthermore, when it comes 
to climatic migrants specifically, the likelihood of them being considered refugees and thus 
something to be handled with urgency is small. This is because a prerequisite for being 
considered a refugee according to the Refugee Convention is that one is fleeing from political 
persecution (Eckersley, 2015). Since migration due to climate change-induced uninhabitability 
does not necessitate anything of that sort, the application of the international customary 
principle of non-refoulement is highly limited too (Albrecht & Plewa, 2015).  
 
Another illustration of how statelessness continues to be a largely neglected issue is the 
continuously growing number of stateless people in the world. Yet, knowing the exact number 
is difficult due to a multiplicity of reasons. One important reason is that stateless people, unlike 
refugees, are rarely registered, documented or granted any legal status (Yamamoto & Esteban, 
2014; Connell, 2015). According to UNHCR (2017), less than half of all states in the world 
keep official track of stateless populations in their territories. Thus, what exists are rough 
estimations, where scholars have contended that there are between 10 to 14 million stateless 
people in the world (see e.g. Edwards & Van Waas, 2014; Piguet, 2019). UNHCR tends to 
keep its estimations vague, often speaking of ‘millions’ of stateless people but rarely 
mentioning how many millions there might be (see e.g. UNHCR 2005; 2006; 2020a). In its 
2017 Global Trend Report, UNHCR admitted that it had been unable to provide thoroughgoing 
statistics on statelessness. In the report UNHCR managed to detect only 3.9 million stateless, 
although the initial estimations were that there are at least 10 million stateless people in the 
world (UNHCR, 2017). Yet, there are additional problematiques making it even more complex 
to make realistic estimations of the magnitude of statelessness. These concern how stateless 
people are being categorised into different types of statelessness called de jure and de facto. 
De jure stateless people lack nationality and thus a legal identity completely. In contrast, de 
facto stateless are lacking proof of having a nationality. The reasons why the latter do so vary, 
and may be due to for example illegal residency, irregular migration or lack of the actual 
documents needed to prove the nationality. Sometimes there is a further distinction made 
between de facto statelessness and effective statelessness, where de facto means the absence of 
legal migration status and effective statelessness means that one is unable to prove one’s 
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nationality (Robinson, 2011). Such further distinction will not be made here. In fact, I will not 
elaborate further which of the categories climatic stateless people are likely to be defined as. 
This is because I consider it to not be fundamental to the thesis. That being said, it may be an 
interesting path to explore in the future if different types of statelessness meet different 
implications when it comes to climate change and the soli/sanguinis-problematiques.  
 
2.5.3. Statelessness tomorrow 
Scholars have begun to underline that a ‘new’ type of statelessness may emerge which could 
affect many people in the future and create extensive legal and political dilemmas. The 
statelessness they refer to could be described as ‘climatic statelessness’, although the exact 
terms used vary among them (see e.g. McAdam, 2010; Yamamoto & Esteban, 2014; Alexander 
& Simon, 2014; Zetter & Morrisey, 2014: Connell, 2015; Piguet, 2019). In contrast to 
‘Arendt’s statelessness’ which arose due to the creation of nation states, this type of 
statelessness is argued to evolve because of the disappearance of them. What the scholars have 
in common is that they all ask what will happen to individuals when climate change begins 
forcing people on the move. While migration due to environmental causes is nothing new in 
human history per se, it is assumed that climate change-induced migration will pose new 
challenges on an international scale (Albrecht & Plewa, 2015). Although it would be 
fundamentally incorrect to refer to climate change as an issue of tomorrow rather than an 
ongoing process, the scale of statelessness which could derive from it is still a great unknown 
for the future to tell.  
 
There are multiple powers and angles featured in the discussions of climatic statelessness. One 
illustrative and extreme angle is that of the ‘sinking state’ (Alexander & Simon, 2014; Piguet, 
2019). Other angles concern for example sudden disasters like tsunamis and storms, slow 
environmental degradation such as permafrost, droughts and desertification, high-risk zones 
defined by governments and scientists and climate change-triggered conflicts (Kälin, 2010). 
The many powers argued to be in play include political, legal, economic and hegemonic socio-
cultural norms and traditions, and they become relevant regardless of from which angle one is 
approaching the question of climatic statelessness (Zetter & Morrisey, 2014; Tabucanon, 
2014). In order to make a coherent argument within the limits of a paper of this sort, it becomes 
necessary to somewhat limit one’s focus. Therefore, in the following the angle of the sinking 
states and the legal power of nationality law principles will be featured. Yet, as the paper seeks 
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to view the issue in a post-structural light, other powers will inevitably be deemed as relevant 
and considered fundamentally interconnected with law.  
 
It is time to conclude this departure and begin to explore questions more directly related to 
climatic statelessness and how ius soli and ius sanguinis aggravate this type of statelessness in 
particular ways. As illustrated above, the principles influence multiple areas of law which 
makes knowledge about them highly relevant. In the following, I will seek to amplify the 
knowledge about them and their malfunctions by placing them in a future scenario where nation 
states are sinking. What I hope has been elucidated to the reader so far is the importance to 
engage in critical explorations of fundamental concepts within international law. Such 
explorations are rarely if ever prosperous if one seeks for all answers within the discipline of 
law solely. Instead, a transdisciplinary approach is here appraised in the attempt to make sense 
of social constructions in the forms of rights, nationality law principles and the phenomenon 
of statelessness.  
 
 
Chapter Three: The Normative Wound 
 
3. Breaking the Westphalian Promise – The Extinction of States 
The previous chapter is termed conceptual and legal in the way it highlights from a critical 
view why and how certain concepts and rights are constructed. This chapter is instead called 
normative in the way it contrasts the presumed desired physical and existing state to the 
presumed undesired vanished and/or uninhabitable one. The chapter begins by describing the 
scientifically supported likelihoods of us finding ourselves in the latter situation. It then 
proceeds with an investigation of there being any modern examples of when nation states have 
endured although the criteria in the Montevideo Convention have not been met. The ‘normative 
wound’ underlined is the centrality of territory; i.e. the body of the nation state, which remains 
unreflexively understood in international law although such understanding becomes 
increasingly challenged by climate change. In that sense, this chapter could be said to primarily 
focus on and explore the abilities of the nation state to uphold nationality in an era of rising sea 




3.1. Positioning the paper in relation to existing research on climate change 
The question of likelihood of states becoming uninhabitable due to climate change is central 
and must be assessed for the thesis of this paper to be of any relevance. Thus, this section of 
the paper will summarise some of the recent findings in climate change research pointing 
towards, and to some extent against, the potential situation of the physical extinction of states. 
This summary is not in any way intended to be all-encompassing or technical in detail, but 
rather serves to illustrate whether or not there is any real-world significance in theorising about 
the hypothetical condition of climatic statelessness. However, as research on climate change is 
fundamentally based upon predictions of futurity and since its evolvement is greatly 
intertwined with global changes, trends within human society, averages and extremes, 
urbanization, population growth, knowledge production, technical advancements among many 
other factors, it is unlikely that any prediction could tell the entire tale of what is to come 
(Rebetez, 2011). Consequently, one must turn to the most realistic forecasts currently available 
when theorising about the future unknown. Such forecasts are arguably made by the IPCC 
which is said to be the world’s leading authority in reporting on climate change and its effects 
(The Royal Society, 2007; UNSG 2018). The UN body was established in 1988 by the United 
Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization 
(WMO) and was later also endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). The 
IPCC regularly publish reports assessing the science on climate change as well as special 
reports on specific environmental issues (IPCC, 2020). This section of the paper and the 
following argumentation proceeds from the findings in some of its recent reports.  
 
Repeatedly emphasised in IPCC’s reports is the direct connection between climate change and 
the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. The temperature is the main factor 
that reflects these concentrations, and the concentrations are expected to continuously increase 
in the following decades. Ultimately, this will also lead to a global increase in temperature 
(IPCC, 2019a). Although this will affect Earth’s regions very differently, some common traits 
have been identified. The frequency of heat waves, extreme weather and wildfires is likely to 
rise, leading to direct and imminent danger for humans, other species and destroyed crops and 
property. There will be a reduction of melt water and changes in rainfall directly affecting the 
availability of water resources and desertification in some areas. In these changing 
environmental circumstances diseases, behavioural patterns and socioeconomic conditions are 
expected to take on new forms and force humans to migrate from where they are currently 
located (Rebetez, 2011; IPCC 2019a). Although the consequences of climate change are 
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numerous: many more than can be discussed in this paper, there is one effect in particular which 
has gained the attention among researches, politicians and the international community as 
being the main threat against the very existence of state territories. It has made the 
representative of Palau declare to the UN General Assembly that ‘[n]ever before in all history 
has the disappearance of whole nations been such a real possibility’ (UNGA, 2008) and it has 
led the Maldivian government to hold a symbolic cabinet meeting underwater as a call for help 
from the rest of the world (Reuters, 2009). Furthermore, IPCC has defined it as the primary 
environmental threat towards the existence of states in the 21st century. The climate change 
these parties all refer to is the sea level rise. 
 
According to IPCC, it is virtually certain (99 % certain or more) that the sea level will rise. In 
its fifth assessment report from 2014, IPCC researchers made estimations of how much the sea 
level will rise until year 2100; something which is depending on the CO2 concentration in the 
atmosphere during the years until then. The IPCC based its calculations on several 
Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) of CO2 concentration, where RCP2.6 
(indicating 2.6 W/m2) represented the ‘best case scenario’ and RCP 8.5 represented the worst. 
In the situation of RCP2.6, a sea-level rise of 0.28-0.61 meters was estimated (IPCC, 2014). 
However, such  concentration is argued to come from a CO2  increase relative to pre-industrial 
conditions. These levels are unlikely to become reality in the near future, as our highly 
industrialised and internationalised society so far has failed to adapt rapidly enough to climate 
researchers’ requests (Hausfather, 2019). The situation of RCP8.5 was instead estimated to 
result in a sea-level rise of 0.52-0.98 meters (IPCC, 2014). However, in 2019 IPCC published 
another report in which the 2014 estimations of the sea-level rise had changed. In the new 
report, RCP2.6 was estimated to lead to a sea level-rise of 0.29-0.59 meters and RCP8.5 to 
0.61-1.10 meters by 2100 (IPCC, 2019b). These changes in estimations arguably illustrate the 
fundamental issue of climate change research; estimations are rarely if ever exact. To some 
extent, this may also illustrate the potential flaws in making calculations on sea-level rise based 
on RCP. However, it does not fall within the scope of this paper to critically examine the utility 
of this calculation method. Instead, the purpose of presenting these shifting forecasts on sea 
level-rise made by the IPCC is to emphasise that the issue of sea level-rise is estimated to 
aggravate in comparison to previous forecasts as the worst-case scenario is turning worse. 
 
Furthermore, as pointed out by the IPCC the sea-level rise is expected to affect areas very 
differently depending on their locations, ecosystems and physical forms. Of primary concern 
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when it comes to the question of complete disappearance are small island developing states 
(SIDS). Studies by the IPCC have shown a sea level-rise of up to four times the global average 
in parts of the western Pacific, suggesting that there is a very high risk of some SIDS becoming 
uninhabitable quicker than the global average numbers illustrated above may suggest. This risk 
is not only a consequence of complete erosion and sinking of land, but is also due to partial 
erosion leading to loss of natural resource and socioeconomic assets enabling people to actually 
live in certain areas (IPCC 2014b). Yet, Etienne Piguet, nominated expert in the IPCC’s fifth 
assessment report, underlines that the number of states in danger of becoming completely 
uninhabitable due to sea level-rise appears quite low at first sight (2019). He argues that only 
3 out of 39 members of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) are likely to become 
completely uninhabitable based on current calculations. Those states are the Maldives, Tuvalu 
and the Marshall Island and they are all situated at particularly low sea levels. Piguet adds 
Nauru and Kiribati to the list due to their geographic conditions which could turn them 
uninhabitable although a considerable amount of land remains above the surface. In total, 
approximately 600 000 habitants live in these five states and they face a high risk of losing 
their nation states in the following 80 years due to sea level rise. However, Piguet underlines 
that there currently exists no extensive study and/or forecast taking into account all components 
necessary to make proper predictions of the states in risk of becoming uninhabitable. Such 
components are for example tectonic movements, geographic conditions and locations. 
Furthermore, the long-term sea level records available from SIDS are very few. This means 
that it is very difficult to separate sea level rises due to climate change from variations due to 
tidal cycles, storms, surges and deep ocean swells (ICPP 2014b).  
 
Ultimately, this means that there being 600 000 people in risk of losing their home states in the 
following years as a consequence of sea level rise is one hypothesis. Due to the multiple factors 
involved in climate change not yet taken into account and the research pointing towards an 
exacerbation of the worst-case scenarios, there are also several other potential hypotheses. For 
example, the 150 million people currently living less than a meter above the sea level or the 
740-1145 million people predicted to live in low elevation coastal zones (LECZ) by 2100 could 
be forced to migrate elsewhere by the end of this century. Many of these people are likely to 
be able to stay in their home states as the geographic conditions allow it (Piguet, 2019; J. Bryan 
and B.C O’Neill, 2016). However, adding to the equation the multiplicity of factors enabling 
individuals to settle, form a society and survive on a landmass, the populations of 57 SIDS risk 
having to forcibly migrate and resettle. 40 of these SIDS are sovereign states and together they 
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are comprised of approximately 69,3 million people (UN, 2015; The World Bank 2019). 
Important to once again underline is that these numbers are solely based on calculating the 
consequences of sea level rise. There is still a great lack of research on the risk of states 
becoming uninhabitable due to for example an increasing number of wild fires, hurricanes, 
tsunamis or other environmental forces born out of the climate changes (Piguet, 2019). Thus, 
the international community could have to face 5 sunken nation states in the following years, 
but it could also have to face 40 or more. This uncertainty of what exactly is to come whilst 
the research is showing that at least some nation states’ territories will disappear is what I seek 
to underline as crucial to consider in the future development of international law and the human 
rights doctrine. The promise of an assiduous territorial Westphalian nation state is about to be 
broken as the risk of state territory extinction is real. The question is solely one of quantity. As 
underlined by Anthony Oliver-Smith (2013) the difficulty in measuring climate change and 
environmental migration cannot be used as an argument to dismiss it. If international law is to 
be updated and prepared for what could come, the predictions of climate research instead ought 
to be woven into it. Otherwise, international law will be unhelpfully hollow when the effects 
of climate change become reality.  
 
3.2. The continuum of statehood when the climate changes 
The paper will now proceed by underlining how ill-equipped international law is to handle the 
situation described above, which becomes visible in the way it gives so very few answers as to 
how to conceive a sunken state. Yet, the most fitting place to start when investigating the 
continuum of statehood is possibly the Montevideo Convention. As previously emphasised 
there are four criteria in the Montevideo Convention defining a state, namely a territory, a 
population, a government and the ability to enter into relations with other states. Thus, the fact 
that the territories of states may vanish due to climate change raise serious questions regarding 
the continuum of the affected nation states and the nationalities associated with them. One 
reason why these queries arise is because there is no criterium nor legally defined moment 
when a state is considered extinct (Piguet, 2019). The customary political- and historical 
scenario has been that states have vanished due to merger or absorption by another state or 
complete re-creation leading to new entities. The potential future scenario of states becoming 
physically inexistent or at least completely uninhabitable is thus a foreign object to the 
traditions of statehood and to international law as currently constructed. There are no mystical 
Atlantis-like nations to use as elucidative illustrations of what to come (McAdam, 2010). 
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Because of this, answering any question regarding the continuum of statehood when a state 
sinks is a great challenge and I do not claim to provide any definitive answers to such statehood 
dilemma. Though, what I will seek to do is highlight some instances where at least one out of 
four criteria of the Montevideo convention has not been met in order to make more informed 
estimations. By also making a critical investigation of physical territory and how it is connected 
to the construction of the nation state, I attempt to provide the reader with a suggestion of what 
the future holds. The primary attention will be given to the criteria of territory and population 
since they are the most central to the question of inhabitability, but the others will also be 
discussed to some extent.  
 
This is a relevant layer to the discussion of the nationality law principles in several ways. For 
example, if statehood can be assumed to continue for a nation state which is no longer 
inhabitable the nationality of such nation state can too be assumed to endure. Its nationality 
laws would then persist and the nationalities granted by it could be expected to be 
acknowledged as valid by the international community. Although this may or may not be a 
guarantee for generations to come, a more or less sudden extinction of the physical state would 
perhaps not necessitate entire populations having to rely on other states’ nationality laws in 
their claim for nationality. If, on the contrary, statehood can be assumed to end as the physical 
state vanishes then the nationality law principles of other nation states could become crucial 
for individuals in search of realising their right to nationality.  
 
3.2.1. Loss of territory 
Territory is here understood as landmass belonging to a nation state. In other words, when 
references are made to ‘territory’ it is understood as a spatial area of soil where a nation state 
has jurisdictional authority and which is neither air nor sea. Territory is important to this thesis 
for several reasons. Firstly, ius soli and ius sanguinis is currently based upon it; the former 
establishes the nationality to people born within a certain nation state territory and the latter 
makes nationality inheritable from parents’ nation state affiliations. At least so far and as will 
be discussed more thoroughly soon, the Western-constructed nation state has been presumed 
to consist of territories (see e.g. Kahn, 2014). Secondly, climate change challenges the 
presumed omnipresence of territorial landmass. Knitting these components together raises 
questions such as “could there be a nation state if it lacks sovereign territory?” and “what will 
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happen to the nationals of such state?”. The former question will be explored in this chapter 
and the latter is reserved for the next.  
 
Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention defines territory as one of four criteria which ought to 
be met in order for a state to come about. There are no definitions nor requirements in 
international law of what size a territory must be in order to meet that criterion (Damrosch et. 
al. 2011). In the case Deutsche Continental Gas-Gesellschaft v. Polish State from 1929, the 
German-Polish Mixed Arbitral Tribunal underlined that the criterion of territory includes no 
minimum boundaries. In the more recent North Seas Continental Shelf Cases, the ICJ reiterated 
that a sufficient consistency of delimitation or definition of territory is enough to meet the 
conditions. However, in the scenario of sinking states it is not really a question whether or not 
the criterion of territory was once met for states like for example Kiribati or Tuvalu; 
undoubtedly it was. Rather, the question is what happens when the nation state already has 
been established but the defined landmass which it was once tied to disappears. Much of the 
modern legal and intellectual tradition defines inhabitable territory as indispensable for a 
variety of reasons, which suggests that a nation state must always have a territory. This is for 
example manifested in the human rights doctrine, in which many of the universal rights require 
a territory. The right to return to one’s home state in article 13(2) of the UDHR and article 
12(4) of ICCPR is perhaps one of the most prominent examples of this. With no soil to return 
to, such rights become practically impossible to uphold. As emphasised in chapter one, the 
very concept of the nation state is founded upon and legitimised by upholding habitants’ rights. 
According to some scholar, it is therefore likely that the loss of territory would equal loss of 
statehood (see e.g. Heather & Alexander, 2014; Reus-Smith 2001).  
 
The customary principle of presumption of continuity has been brought up against the claim 
that the sovereign state ends as its territory sinks. Scholars emphasising the applicability of the 
principle mean that regardless of uninhabitability, a nation state will remain a nation state as 
long as others recognise it as such (McAdam, 2010; Yaamoto & Esteban, 2014). UNHCR 
(2011) has underlined the importance of remembering the principle and to avoid using a 
language that suggests that nation states can disappear. However, there are also scholars who 
are problematising such reading of the principle. As suggested by Heather Alexander and 
Jonathan Simon (2014), the principle of presumption of continuity cannot be understood as 
suggesting that sunken states are guaranteed to remain nation states within the international 
community. They highlight how the principle instead helps to determine whether an established 
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state is part of a new state or if it is continuous with an old one. Although Alexander and Simon 
do not go as far as to claim that nation states definitely will not recognise sunken states as 
sovereign, they underline that there is no international customary principle that recommends 
that they should. Neither are there any provisions in the Statelessness Conventions concerning 
how states should act in such instances. Consequently, it seems as if the only guarantee a nation 
state like Tuvalu currently holds to remain a sovereign entity is international recognition. 
Heather and Alexander (2014) consider that to be a weak assurance. In contrast, Jane McAdam 
(2010) deems such recognition to be the cornerstone of international relations; exemplifying 
that even ‘failed’ states have remained accepted throughout history in order to maintain 
economic, technical and political relations. She and other legal experts such as Christel Cournil 
consider it unlikely that other nation states would suddenly depart from the status quo and stop 
recognising states which physically perish. Cournil also underlines that the division of the seas 
into territorial waters could be a possible way for sunken states to remain sovereign bodies as 
the maritime zones offer control over at least some parts of the earth. She means that this could 
in turn allow for its citizens to hold on to their passports and nation state belonging (Cournil, 
2011; Piguet, 2019). However, sinking states pose great challenges from a Law of the Sea 
perspective too. As illustrated by Eduardo Jiménez Pineda (2018), maritime zones are drawn 
and measured in relation to land in accordance to the customary principle of the domination of 
the land over the sea. Meanwhile, article 76 of UNCLOS establishes that states’ delineations 
of their continental shelves are final and binding. This illustrates how the international 
regulation of the seas is not designed with the loss of territorial land in mind either, since it too 
appears ambiguous as soon as the example of vanishing territory is brought into the analysis. 
Consequently, the guarantee of keeping one’s territorial waters once the state sinks is as 
uncertain as the guarantee to keep the status of statehood once the sovereign’s land is gone. 
 
What may be concluded from this is that there are multiple answers to what will happen in the 
situation of a ‘real Atlantis’ and whether or not international law is equipped to handle it. Due 
to a lack of regulations and historical examples, the outcome becomes a range of conflicting 
guesstimates. However, inhabitability generally requires more than mere land to stand on. This 
makes the criterion of territory in the Montevideo Convention tightly connected to the other 
conditions of statehood. By taking more than the loss of actual territory into account one may 





3.2.2. Loss of politics 
The discussions regarding the loss of territorial land are multidimensional and suggest that the 
criterion of territory cannot be completely isolated from the other criteria in the Montevideo 
Convention. For example, Stefan Talmon (2011) argues that both the criterion of government 
and that of capacity to enter into relations with other states can to some degree been fulfilled 
despite the lack of territory through governments in exile. He underlines that history is filled 
with examples of governments who have been able to enter treaties, maintain jurisdiction over 
its nationals and diplomatic relations and much more although the administrations have been 
located outside of their own nation states. This has included providing passports and other 
registration documents which have prevented their people from turning de facto stateless. 
However, the scope of jurisdiction for a government in exile is restricted. In the Allied Forces 
(Czechoslovak) Case (1941–42) 10 AD No 31, 123, 124 (cited in Talmon), it was observed that 
an absolute right to govern exists only within one’s own territory. Accordingly, the government 
in exile is somewhat limited by the sovereign rights of the nation state in which the 
administration resides. Furthermore, government in exile is assumed to be a temporary solution 
(McAdam, 2010). To illustrate, Somalia had no effective government on site during the late 
20th Century until the beginning of the 21st Century. During this time, it was even challenging 
for many Somalis to obtain official documents and/or verifications which were recognised by 
other nation states. For example, New Zealand did not accept Somali passports at the time. 
However, this was a temporary status of the Somali government (Yamamoto & Esteban, 2014). 
The Somali government’s exile has now ended and Somalia remains a recognised nation state 
by the international community although the government and its allies are accused of both 
grave human rights violations and highly volatile and ineffective governance (Human Rights 
Watch, 2020). The Somali example illustrates two things. On one hand, it shows how a 
government may be severely ‘failing’ and operating in exile for a while yet remain a recognised 
nation state. On the other hand, it shows how the ‘quality’ of governance from a human rights 
perspective does not have to be particularly good in order for the international recognition to 
endure. 
 
However, the numerous examples highlighted by Talmon where the criterion of government 
and entering into relations with other states have been upheld are non-concordant to the 
situation of climate change-induced uninhabitability. Permanence is then a fact which cannot 
be disregarded. Hence, an alternative solution to meet the criterion of government has been 
suggested by the former president of Kiribati Anote Tong. His proposal is an establishment of 
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a small government outpost on Banaba Island, which is the highest point of Kiribati. This 
solution has not yet been practically tested (McAdam, 2010). Therefore, the suggestions of 
how to meet these Montevideo criteria are filled with question-marks. As will become evident 
in the following, it may not even be the most crucial basis for sinking states in the question of 
sovereignty nor for its people to keep their nationality. 
 
3.2.3. Loss of population 
In the situation of a state sinking the migration of the population could be assumed to more or 
less occur in tandem with the administration's exile or repositioning. Therefore, the permanent 
population-criterion of the Montevideo Convention becomes central in this particular scenario 
and is not definitely solved through any constructions of tiny parliamentary stations on higher 
altitudes nor governments residing abroad. McAdam (2010) suggests that it could even be the 
absence of a permanent population which becomes the primary challenger of the sovereign 
nation state. Drawing back to what was discussed in chapter two, the sovereign nation state has 
indeed become a society of many; meaning that the people forming such society is crucial for 
the nation state’s existence. What happens when the cells of the sovereign body abandon it? In 
case climate change alters living conditions so severely that human migration becomes 
necessary long before the sea covers the land, McAdam (2010) suggests that it is not the lack 
of territory nor government on site but the lack of habitants which could end statehood. 
Paradoxically, this would mean that the migration of the population from a sinking state would 
be what renders their nation state extinct. 
 
International law provides no exact definition of how large a population ought to be in order to 
‘count’ as a population (McAdam, 2010). For example, there were 12 581 people living in 
Tuvalu in 2019 (The World Bank, 2020). Furthermore, the requisite of ‘permanent’ is kept 
undefined and ambiguous. This may be illustrated by the fact that approximately 56.9 percent 
of all Samoans live outside of the Independent State of Samoa; meaning that not even the 
majority of a population ought to live permanently in the nation state in order for it to count as 
one (McAdam, 2010). However, in a sunken state or at least in a nation state so physically 
damaged due to sea-level rise that one cannot live there, the population size could be assumed 
to eventually turn close to zero. In such a situation, it would not be merely due to economic or 
social reasons a part, the majority or even the entire population leave the territory. The 
migration would then greatly and even fundamentally have to do with climate change, which 
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is also why there is an important theoretical distinction between climatic migration and other 
types of migration (though a practical distinction is perhaps not as easily made) (see e.g. 
Eckersley, 2015; Albrecht & Plewa, 2015). Although history is filled with examples of 
population transfers and forced migrations, resettlements due to sinking states remain a 
glooming issue of the future (see e.g. Ahmad, 2017). No modern nation state has had to transfer 
its entire people and empty itself of a permanent population. Yet, there are examples of when 
an entity perhaps does not meet the requirement of a permanent population but is still 
considered a nation state. A prominent case is the Vatican City. As emphasised by John R. 
Morss (2016), no one would become stateless if the Vatican City was to vanish or if one’s 
citizenship from there would be terminated. This is because the population of the Vatican City 
is transient and mainly consists of employees, papal officials and their families. This illustrates 
how a place on Earth could in fact be considered a nation state even if it lacks a permanent 
population. However, one ought to remember how the Vatican City is a peculiarity in the 
international society. It somewhat seems to be the exception that proves the rule that nation 
states are expected to have permanent populations. Therefore, the answer to what happens to 
for example Marshallese nationals if the Marshall Islands were to sink is likely to differ to that 
of the Vatican City. 
 
What I have sought to stress by going through the statehood criterion in the Montevideo 
Convention is that exceptions occur. There are examples of when it is questionable if the 
criterion of a permanent population is actually met in what nevertheless is considered to be a 
nation state. There are also situations where governance and diplomatic relations have 
sustained despite a lack of physical control over a territory. However, there are no historical 
examples of when a sovereign nation state has remained as such although it no longer consists 
of a physical territory where its population can reside. This could perhaps suggest that there 
cannot be a nation state if it lacks territory, but once again; there are no case studies 
substantiating such an answer. All of this leads to the conclusion that the futures of sinking 
states and their populations are extremely difficult to anticipate from dogmatic legal-, 
historical- or political perspectives. Evidentially, they do not provide abounding clues to 
whether or not states such as Marshall Islands and Tuvalu will remain recognised sovereign 
entities in 2100. In that way, one could say that the continuum of statehood as the sea level 
rises is somewhat of a loose cannon in international law. However, instead of searching in its 





3.3. Loss of a sovereign body 
A nation state can be understood as somewhat of an imaginary person. Legal sources such as 
article 1 of the Montevideo Convention even use a language endorsing such understanding, as 
it refers to the nation state as a person of international law. As formulated by Philipp Jessup 
(UNSC, 1948), the presumption of the territorial state remains and stems from the social 
construction of the nation states as an organic figure; a personified entity. Going back to the 
discussion of the nation state hypothesised as being a living and breathing entity, the territory 
could therefore be described as its body (see e.g. Reus-Smith, 2001). Jessup underlines that 
this construction has made it impossible for us to contemplate nation states as incorporeal 
spirits (UNSC, 1948). Accordingly, the nation state without its body; i.e. its territory, is 
arguably ‘dead’. While some legal scholars such as McAdam and Cournil (2010; 2011) put 
faith in the continued existence of nation states through unceasing recognition, the idea of 
territory as the embodiment of sovereignty challenges such convictions. A sunken state 
becomes a bodiless abstraction of what it once was. If we continue to use the metaphoric 
description of the nation state as a person, a complete lack of living cells (i.e. human beings) 
makes it impossible for such creature to survive. The international community may continue 
to recognise the uninhabitable nation state like one remembers a deceased friend. Still, the 
abilities of the vanished to participate, affect, resist, endorse, cooperate and be within the 
structure inevitably become limited if not even non-existent. According to this rationale, the 
sunken state once being an active albeit hypothesised agent is likely to become a ghost; 
continuing to exist merely as a historical and folkloristic ‘once upon a time, there was a nation 
state called…’-example. 
 
As phrased by Guattari (1989/2000) this does mean that it is not only species which are 
becoming extinct in what sometimes is referred to as the sixth mass extinction on the Earth 
(see e.g. National Geographic, 2019). Part of the three-dimensional space of soil, sea and air 
which brings materiality to the otherwise immaterial sovereign and which creates a legal and 
political space from where populations gain self-referential identities is about to vanish too 
(see Billé et. al, 2020; Kahn, 2014). As illustrated above, this space has been constructed as 
something sacred; a foundation for the collective imagination of the shared nation state society. 
Without such space and without any post-national reconstruction of what is thought to form a 
society, one may argue that the sunken or uninhabitable nation state means the end of its 
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statehood and the end of its ability to uphold the nationality of its subjects (see e.g Kahn, 2014). 
As emphasised by McAdam (2010) in international law, there is no room for a nationality to 
exist if the nation state does not.  
 
Chapter Four: Critical Considerations 
 
4. Soli, Sanguinis & Sinking States 
The previous chapter sought to highlight how the sacred, royal territorial sovereign may 
become dethroned and drowned by sea level rise. The fact that such a scenario is so likely to 
happen yet so unthought-of is what I argue to be a normative wound in international law. This 
wound also puts light to the existing legal vacuum regarding how to take care of the affected 
subjects. Therefore, ius soli and ius sanguinis will here be argued to be outgrowths and/or 
infections in that wound; meaning that the legal ways in which people keep or gain new 
nationalities necessitates the existence of territorial land. Without it, the principles become 
even more dysfunctional than they already are and the risk of statelessness consequently 
becomes even higher for those migrating due to climate change than for other migrants. To 
support this argument, a number of case studies will be briefly presented. These cases include 
the historical example of the devastation of the Bikini Atoll and the legal example of the 
Swedish Alien Act. Hence, this third and final chapter can be said to explore in closer detail 
the individual rights perspective and the critical junction between that perspective and the 
nation state perspective. 
 
The proceeding discussion suggests that there are inherent contradictions between the 
nationality law principles and the right to a nationality particularly noticeable in the case of 
climatic statelessness. To support this argument, the chapter will give more room to the 
mainstream assumption of physical territory, explore how it permeates the principles and 
attempt to show how nationalities promised by the principles cannot endure without physical, 
sovereign land. This is perhaps also where my contribution to the ongoing conversation 
becomes most visible. The conflicting arrangement of the right to a nationality and the 
sovereign right trumping the former has been highlighted by scholars many times before me 
(see e.g. Edwards & Van Waas, 2014; Giustiniani, 2016; Owen, 2018). In the junction between 
the two we find the nationality law principles which are said to construct national citizens and 
to uphold individuals’ right to belong to a nation state. By proposing that territorial landmass 
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is crucial for the functioning of the principles, I hope to bring novelty to the climatic 
statelessness-discussion.   
 
4.1. The nationality law principles – life jackets or sinkers?  
If I am being frank, Marshall Island will shed no tears from turning uninhabitable. It is not 
‘Marshall Island the abstraction’ which needs to be saved and which poses the most pressing 
dilemma in this sinking state-discussion. Rather, I am concerned with what happens to the 
Marshallese, Tuvaluans or other populations who live on territories severely threatened by sea 
level rise. I have suggested that the sunken nation state is likely to cease to exist as a recognised 
sovereign entity in this currently very nation state-centred order. This ultimately means that 
there is a risk of entire populations turning stateless due to climate change, which gives reason 
to consider the ways in which they could uphold their right to nationality.  
 
The international human rights doctrine suggests that there is an aspiration that people continue 
to have a nationality. From a human rights perspective, the question of the individual is even 
primary in relation to that of the sovereign state’s continued existence. Yet, nowhere does it 
say what nationality the affected people ought to have; the old (uncertain and perhaps even 
extinct) one or a new one. Perceptibly, the latter alternative seems to be less of a riddle to solve 
since the Montevideo criteria will continue to be met by a large number of nation states albeit 
the predicted sea level rise. The proceeding argumentation will therefore be based upon the 
premise that a new nation state belonging is desirable over an inexistent one. Making such 
assumption is problematic for several reasons and cultural insensitivity may be one of the 
greatest. People from SIDS or other nation states threatened by climate change are not likely 
to voluntarily give up their nationality since the claim to nationality does not exist in a 
sociocultural void. There are many cultures in which the soil is considered spiritual and directly 
connected to the human itself, which is the case in many Pacific Island communities (see e.g. 
Kälin 2010; Oliver-Smith, 2013; Tabucanon, 2014). Making the assumption that they are better 
off with another nationality than their ‘original’ one may therefore be highly inappropriate from 
an individual perspective. However, it is perhaps also a valid assumption to make from the 
very same perspective if nationality is considered the key to a life in which as many of the 
human rights as possible are accessible and sustained. Because in contrast to the nation state 
which may subsist due to exemptions as illustrated above, Arendt (1951/2017) underlined that 
there is no such exception allowing people without a nationality to be treated equal to those 
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who have a national belonging. Instead, individuals without a nationality become the exception. 
It is with the intention to pinpoint options of avoiding such condition I make the assumption 
that having a nationality is currently better than having no nationality. That being said, a 
continuous conversation about sociocultural bonds to soil versus the perpetuation of the right 
to nationality would be an important and interesting advancement of the proposition made here. 
 
For these reasons, the nationality law principles in place to prevent exceptional cases from 
arising become of major relevance. However, it is not only public international law nor the law 
of the sea which have been formed in an order where the physicality of territory has been taken 
for granted. Virtually all contemporary international law has been created within that order. As 
emphasised above; even human rights derive from and are finely knitted together with the 
notion of the sovereign and territorial nation state. Therefore, what will happen to those who 
may no longer be able to officially refer to themselves as ‘Marshallese’, ‘Tuvaluan’ or 
‘Maldivian’ ought to be further investigated. Ius soli and ius sanguinis become highly relevant 
for this reason, since they could be said to be the ‘keys’ to national belonging and to the other 
human rights. Meanwhile, nation states have their right to adopt whichever of the principles 
they like. The trend is that individuals now ought to meet a growing number of conditions in 
order to receive the nationality promised by the principles (De Groot & Vink, 2018). In that 
way, climatic statelessness is no different from ‘mainstream statelessness’; all people 
attempting to gain a nationality are challenged by principles which require people to meet 
specific qualifications relating to their past. What I argue makes climatic statelessness 
particularly challenging is that the ways to avoid statelessness are fewer, because going back 
is practically impossible yet the principles presuppose the existence of such option. Therefore, 
while war and oppression as social and mental forces have made millions of people stateless 
the ‘new’ environmental force of climate change puts light to another dimension of the issue. 
To clarify what I mean, I will begin by providing the reader with the case of Bikini Island:  
 
4.1.1. Case study: Bikini Island 
Although the resettlement of the Bikini population on the Bikini Atoll is perhaps not a clear-
cut example of climate-induced uninhabitability due to sea level rise, it is still an important 
case study of environmental migration. The Bikini Atoll belonged to the Marshall Islands and 
its population was resettled in the mid 1940s because the US decided to make Bikini Island a 
nuclear testing site. After receiving the information that the island was going to be used for this 
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purpose, it took less than a month until the entire population of 167 people was moved. The 
majority was relocated to a US-constructed new village on the island Rongerik which later 
proved to be a resource-poor and infertile sandbank. Two years later, in 1948, the then nearly 
starved population was once again relocated to Kili. A third relocation was made in 1978 to 
Ejit Island. Returning to Bikini Island and the neighbouring islands was not an option as the 
former had been blown away by bombs such as ‘Bravo’; a nuclear bomb 1000 times stronger 
than the one dropped on Hiroshima and the latter had become highly radioactive due to the 
testing. The radioactivity also forced the Rongelap, Banaban-, Utrik-, and Ailinginae 
populations to resettle on other islands (Tabucanon, 2014).  
 
These forced migrations have now made the Bikinians and other Marshallese highly dependent 
on the US Government. Through several trust funds, compensation funds and agreements, the 
US has attempted to compensate the Marshallese population for the nuclear tests that destroyed 
their homes. For example, the Marshall Islands Compact of Free Association allows 
Marshallese to travel and live in the US without visa requirements. This has led many of the 
islanders and their descendants to move, work and study in the US (Gwynne, 2012). Some of 
them have even gained US nationality (Bloom, 2017). As the US adheres to ius soli, the 
children of Marshallese nationals born in the US gain a US nationality. However, the 
Marshallese nationals who have not been born in the US are highly dependent on the bilateral 
agreement since they are generally not considered US nationals as a consequence of the 
nationality laws. As the current Marshallese government is China-friendly, a growing fear is 
that the Compact will not be renewed in 2023 which would mean that the Marshallese living 
in the US would lose their legal status allowing them to remain in the US. This could force 
them back to Marshall Island where the threat of rising sea-levels is tangible (Rust, 2019). 
Since the Constitution of the Marshall Islands 1978 Art XI, s 1(2)(b) also puts an emphasis on 
the acquisition of nationality through ius soli, these people do not become stateless since their 
Marshallese nationality remains intact (see e.g. Dziedzic, 2020). This means that although the 
return to Marshall Island could pose serious issues to those acclimated to a life in the US, it 
would not render them stateless today. If Marshall Islands were to disappear under the ocean 
surface in the future however, a great uncertainty regarding their nationality arises. According 
to the US application of ius soli, they would not be considered US nationals and the US has no 
obligation to make them Americans (see Yamamoto & Esteban, 2014). Although they would 
have a Marshallese nationality according to the same principle, the absence of territory and 
habitants of Marshall Islands could mean that nationality from there will fade more or less 
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suddenly. Thus, the Marshallese are not only hanging by a thread due to the puzzling question 
of what happens to the sovereign Marshall Islands if its territory sinks. They also face great 
challenges because there are nationality law principles which are making them ineligible to 
gain a new nationality from another nation state to which they have developed social, cultural 
and economic ties.  
 
The case of the Bikini Atoll is evidentially not perfectly fitting to that of the sinking state in 
the way it was blown away rather than gradually disappearing. In that way, perhaps more 
sudden yet climate change-induced events such as earthquakes, tsunamis or volcanic outbreaks 
are more closely comparable to the Bikini case. It does however highlight how the impossibility 
to return in combination with exclusionary nationality law principles are posing great 
challenges to the people forced on the move. In the following, I will elaborate further on how 
the principles are challenging the right to nationality rather than guaranteeing it.  
 
4.1.2. A watertight right? – the practical reality of nationality law and 
the Swedish Alien Act 
Scholars such as Perelló (2018) seemingly suggest that it was the introduction of ius sanguinis 
to the system of nationality law which made the number of stateless people in the world grow. 
Undoubtedly, when grounding nationality upon legal parental heritage it affects not only first 
generations but also generations to come (Yamamoto & Esteban, 2014). For those seeking 
refuge from a place they can never return to, such rule risks putting individuals into a Catch-
22. Although stateless who have fled conflict and oppression also may have done so with a 
sense of impossibility of return, such impossibility is a matter of fact for populations from 
sunken states. However, the Bikini Island case illustrates that ius soli is not unproblematic from 
the perspective of climatic statelessness either. The principle becomes treacherous in several 
ways. Firstly, the ‘soil’ on which the principle is based upon is subject to international 
recognition. Perhaps even more so when that soil is no longer visible or inhabitable. Once such 
recognition fades, the nationality gained from such principle can be assumed to fade too. 
Secondly, the principle makes it difficult for individuals to ‘start over’ since it is based upon 
the situation one found oneself in at birth. While people in time may be able to naturalise into 
their new home states, they are not legally guaranteed to do so. The right to a nationality simply 
does not include the right to naturalise (Owen, 2018). Instead, the customary nationality law 
principles and the human right to a nationality are the only ‘guarantees’ there are. Yet while a 
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‘clean’ application of ius soli may assure future generations of climatic stateless to gain 
nationality, the trend of nation states adding ius sanguinis-elements to the mixture obstructs 
such function (De Groot & Vonk, 2018; Yamamoto & Esteban, 2014).  
 
Translated to some sort of everyday reality, this means that people have to choose carefully 
where they are to seek shelter in order not to risk falling between the chairs and turn stateless. 
In a political climate where different versions of ius soli and ius sanguinis are proliferating and 
fluctuating, it is for obvious reasons very challenging to make informed and sustainable choices 
of where to go. Yet, focusing one’s attention to individuals’ undertakings to ensure themselves 
new nationalities may be inadequate. Regardless of how informed a Tuvaluan may be about 
the applicable nationality law principles in its intended nation state of refuge once Tuvalu 
becomes uninhabitable, the problem boils down to nation states not granting everyone 
nationalities anyways (Kingston, 2013). Although treaties such as the Stateless Conventions, 
the 1997 European Convention on Citizenship and other international human rights treaties 
refer to article 15 of the UDHR and oblige nation states to avoid creating statelessness, the 
application of the nationality law principles nevertheless enables nation states to be selective 
and more or less (in)directly create statelessness. Owen (2018) underlines how this represents 
a legitimacy problem in international law. The deprivation of political standing for individuals 
has become structural through the principles, which facilitate the absolute autonomy of nation 
states rather than the individual right to a nationality (De Groot & Vonk, 2018). While at first 
glance appearing like tools to uphold the right to nationality, ius soli and ius sanguinis rather 
function like smoke screens for exclusionary national legislations where the right to nationality 
is disrespected. The immigration laws of Sweden are suitable illustrations of this when it comes 
to climatic migrants specifically. In Sweden, the principle of ius sanguinis is in use. However, 
additional elements have been added to the sanguinis-mixture. Accordingly, it is not enough 
to have lived in Sweden the required amount of years to be considered descended from Sweden 
(for stateless people: four years), but one also needs to have obtained asylum. Although natural 
disasters are identified as valid reasons to apply and receive Swedish asylum, no one has ever 
been granted asylum for that reason under the Swedish Alien Act (Utlänningslagen, SFS 
2005:716) (SOU 2020:54; Albrecht & Plewa, 2015). Moreover, a ‘temporary’ Swedish Alien 
Act (SFS 2016:752) now makes climatic migrants ineligible to receive asylum. This is because 
they are considered ‘others in need of protection’ rather than clear-cut refugees 
(Migrationsinfo, 2020). They are, to once again underline the refugee/stateless dichotomy, not 
a prioritised subject of protection in Sweden. 
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Whilst the Swedish temporary Alien Act from 2016 has been renewed (see SFS 2019:481) and 
evidently turns less and less temporary, the future of higher sea levels is sneaking closer and 
closer. Meanwhile, statelessness is not handled as a here-and-now-issue. Despite much 
research pointing towards exacerbating scenarios, climate change is not something handled 
acutely neither. In combination, we have the climatic stateless person; the neglected2. As the 
current Swedish usage of ius sanguinis suggests, Sweden is currently a pointless destination in 
case that person needs a new nationality. What is equally problematic is that the US usage of 
ius soli suggests the same. A conclusion which may be drawn from this is that no one’s right 
to a nationality is watertight when these principles are continuously and unreflexively in use 
by nation states in the international community. Furthermore, it illustrates how the 
interweaving of the two normative elements of sovereignty and human rights are inherently 
contradictory in the modern discourse. It is, as phrased by Reus-Smith ‘[…] a discourse that 
seeks to justify territorial particularism on the grounds of ethical universalism’ (2001:520).  
 
4.2. Territorial particularism versus ethical universalism  
As emphasised above, territory is fundamental to international law and to the construction of 
the nation state. One may even refer to it as its body; something making an otherwise abstract 
construction tangible. However, it is not only in relation to the question of statehood that 
territory matters. Migration and climate change are issues having clear territorial dimensions 
too; people migrate from one territory to another and climate change affects territories in 
different ways. This calls for a normative understanding and critical examination of territory 
and what role it plays in the construction of international law. More specifically, I am 
concerned with the role it plays for the human right to nationality and the nationality law 
principles. Yet, as underlined by Margaret Moore (2020) conceptualisations and justifications 
of territory remain relatively unmentioned in academia. In accordance with the Westphalian 
tradition, territory has been understood more as a historical product establishing sovereignty 
rather than a spatial and relative element.  
 
The Westphalian way of conceiving territory has enabled the construction of territorial rights. 
As underlined by Avery Kolers (2009) this construction is deeply perplexing, since the rights-
holder (the nation state) cannot be recognised independently of its rights. In other words; while 
a human being is a human being independently of it having rights or not (which the stateless is 
a demonstration of), a sovereign territory is identified through its territorial rights. Regardless 
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of such perplexity, the nation state and its territorial rights are powerful constructions which 
have remained rather unchallenged and have become established as common knowledge. 
Consequently, the puzzling rights and powers of the nation state now form our knowledge 
about the nation state itself (see e.g. Foucault, 1976/2008a; 1997/2008b). The most essential 
of nation states’ entitlements may be the right of jurisdiction. The right to apply and make 
variations of ius soli and ius sanguinis become a clear manifestation of this. Yet, neither of 
these principles are applied in symbiosis with article 15 of the UDHR. Nation states like 
Sweden and the US seem to have found ways to create loopholes when it comes to both birth-
right and blood-right and they are not alone. Millions of people have fallen short in meeting 
nation states’ demands and ambiguous uses of the principles. This troublesome paradox may 
be defined as a fundamental clash between what Reus-Smith (2001) calls ethical universalism 
versus territorial particularity. Sylvain Kahn further describes such clash by emphasising how 
“[t]he territory considered as national is sacred, which makes the idea intolerable or very 
worrying that it can be populated by communities or individuals who are foreign to it” 
(2014:21). This is a worry which could be argued to stem from the notion that the population 
is an extension of the sovereign body (Foucault, 1975/2020; O’Manique 1990). No aliens may 
be allowed to enter it, because this could cause the nation state to stop functioning (see e.g 
Arendt, 1951/2017). As the reader might have noticed now, we have come back to the 
importance of critically engaging in concepts; some of which were described in chapter two. 
When the hypothesis of the artificial ‘man’ called the nation state risks invasion, the barricades 
of exclusionary domestic laws are raised.   
 
International law and the human rights doctrine somewhat challenge the territorial particularity, 
as they inflict on the sovereign right to do precisely as one likes at all times. But they are both 
legal areas intertwined with the idea of nation state and when it comes to nationality law 
principles, the domestic autonomy is kept intact. This is evident in the way UDHR nor any 
other international legal source determine which nation state should uphold an individual’s 
right to a nationality. Since the territorial right and the very idea of territory as the sovereign’s 
body remain so powerful, “[t]he right [to a nationality] amount[s] to nothing more than an 
emphatic statement of principle without clear content” (Giustiniani, 2016:8). Thus, in the 
collision between ethical universalism and territorial particularity; the body of the individual 
versus the body of the nation state; David versus Goliath, the latter wins. The phenomenon of 
statelessness could be argued to overtly confirm this. In that sense, the nationality law 
principles could be seen as the bones of the territorial particularity. It keeps the body of the 
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nation state upright, as the principles are the ultimate legal tools of inclusion and exclusion. 
Undoubtedly, this outcome is desirable from a nation state perspective. Simultaneously it strips 
humans of their rights; humans which are the very constructors and re-constructors of the 
nation state itself. To make sense of this paradox, it may be helpful to apply Didier Bigo’s 
metaphor of the Möbius strip (2002; 2018). We may then think of sovereign territory as 
constituting the strip. On one side of it, the hypothesised person called ‘the nation state’ stands. 
On the other side stand individuals who seek yet not meet the qualifications of nationality. 
Whereas one will conceive the strip as a source of rights, the other will experience it at a rights-
depriver. Thus, while one gains rights through the established construction of territory, the 
other becomes rights(less). Although the International Bill of Human Rights in some instances 
obliges nation states to act in specific ways for the sake of the individual and consequently 
converts who is the rights(less), the stubborn avoidance to adopt uniform nationality rules 
grants nation states the right to exclude. Consequently, the idea of an inalienable, ethical 
universalism evanesces.   
 
4.3. Territorial relativism and the forgotten ecology   
Although territorial particularity is suggested to constitute a social construction outplaying the 
idea of ethical universalism, everything is brought to its head when one reconsiders territory 
itself. Since the conventional view of sovereign territory does not take into account the spatial 
relativity of landmass, climate change leading to a rise of the sea level poses a great problem 
to what international law seems to suggest is an invincible sovereign (see McAdam, 2010). In 
order to make sense of how territory is in fact an unfixed and multidimensional space, Harvey 
Starr (2005) suggests that we ought to revisit the mainstream understanding of it. The 
jurisprudential assumption of territory as an omnipresent entity is evidentially unsustainable in 
light of rising sea levels and should instead be acknowledged as just one of its many 
representations. Anthony Galton leaves it in clear wordings: ‘[e]verything I see on a map can 
be described as geographical information. It is obvious that such information comes in many 
different forms. Representing a town by pacing a small circle at a specific location on the map 
is quite different from showing the extent of woodland by colouring areas of the map green’ 
(2001:173). Through these words, Galton puts light to the fact that even something so 
seemingly factual as earth itself has socially constructed dimensions and is filled with different 




In a quote originally by Foucault but with the word ‘state’ exchanged with ‘territory’ Stuart 
Elden further illuminates how ‘[t]erritory is not a universal; Territory is not in itself an 
autonomous source of power. Territory is nothing else but the effect, the profile, the mobile 
shape of a perpetual territorialisation or territorialisations […] Territory is nothing else but the 
mobile effect of a regime of multiple governmentalities’ (2013:18; Foucault, 2008:77). Thus, 
territory can be understood as multidimensional space continuously shaped by agents who 
speak of it, place circles on maps, exploit woodlands and unresponsively observe while some 
of the green parts on the maps turn blue. It is neither a passive gimmick of political struggle 
nor a static tool of political action. Instead, it is a construction continuously shaped by- and in 
itself shaping the order. This understanding of territory could also be argued to illustrate how 
the three ecologies of the social, mental and environmental described by Guattari (1989/2000) 
are interconnected. Accordingly, territory is not merely an objective and material entity. 
Rather, it is also a social and mental space in the way it constitutes the source of rights for both 
individuals and sovereigns, a home, a cultural place, a source of language production, a place 
of belonging and much more. However, it is also an environmental space. Since the 
environment is interconnected with the social and mental according to Guattari, this means that 
territory and its social and mental dimensions are inevitably also stimulated by forces of nature. 
In other words, territory (soil) is not merely a social construction tied to the nation state or the 
foundation for the nationality law principles. It is also environmental. This has to be kept in 
mind in order for any human notion to function long-term and in symphony with nature.  
 
Nonetheless, the environmental ecology has evidentially been neglected in the construction of 
territory in international law and such neglect will eventually lead to significant 
problematiques. This does not only become evident when assessing the Montevideo 
Convention’s criteria of what a nation state is, the UNCLOS provisions of how to divide the 
oceans nor the human right to return to a territory. Nation states’ employment of nationality 
law principles making soil central and human rights entangled with it without the faintest 
suggestion of what to do when nature comes washing in is an example of this which ultimately 
jeopardises individuals access to other human rights. Possibly, it is the neglect of the entire 
environmental dimension of territory which so far has hindered legal scholars from making 
anything but guesstimates of what happens to a nation state and its nationals as the sea level 
rises. If territory was accepted not only as a space filled with social or mental ecologies or 
constructions such as nation states, human rights and principles but also as a space of 
environmental ecology prone to physical transformation, the sinking state would perhaps not 
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pose as great of an issue to international law. However, since depicting the nation state as 
something socially constructed and not static is a still ongoing project it seems to be even 
further away to establish a general acceptance of territorial relativism. 
 
4.4. Soli without soil and a sustainable development of international law 
While much of the previous critique of ius soli and ius sanguinis has emphasised how the 
principles have become tools for the sovereign rather than guarantors for individuals’ right to 
a nationality (see e.g. De Groot & Vonk, 2018; Yamamoto & Esteban, 2014; Owen, 2018), a 
reflexive analysis of territory suggests there are more issues inherent to the principles than the 
clash between two rights subjects. The latter exhibits that there are inherent flaws in the 
mainstream understanding of what territory has been, is and may become. Since its spatial 
relativity exposed by climate change has not been taken into account in the construction of 
international law, the question is what may happen to a right based on soil (either one’s own 
or one’s parents) if the very soil itself proves to be inconstant. Conceivably, the principles 
could only function as a guarantor of nationality as long as territory remains a fixed entity 
where one can be born. Because as the Bikini case illustrates, the problem of applying ius soli 
only occurs when Marshall Islands is presumed to have sunken. Only then the grand confusion 
arises and the guesstimates begin. As the Swedish application of ius sanguinis and its additional 
requirements demonstrates, such laws create statelessness and thus violate international 
conventions first when the impossibility to return is a fact. Before the dramatic forecasted 
changes induced by climate change take place, the status quo is kept intact and the depiction 
of territory as a solid and corporal sovereign unit seemingly needs no reconsideration. Before 
lawyers, politicians and others acknowledge that there is an additional ecology outside human 
minds and lives which is playing on the very same field, ius soli and ius sanguinis can continue 
to make people stateless due to the reason that nation states have sovereign rights.  
 
Evidentially, the principles are far from unproblematic even before introducing the post-
structural proposition that territory is something more than plain land and even something more 
than a metaphoric depiction of a sovereign’s body. The reader might now even ask what the 
value is of incorporating such an ostensibly unfathomable image of territory into the discussion. 
If territory is indeed nothing else but rootless outcomes of multiple governmentalities; both of 
social, mental and environmental nature, what is the point of theorising about it and how do 
we make use of it? Well, perhaps territory should not be made use of in the way it currently is. 
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Perhaps it should not be central to humans and their right to access other rights for the very 
reason that it is too complex and fuzzy. Territory is both far more and much less than the 
property of the nation state, a place of birth and a source of rights. If the human rights doctrine 
is to remain purposive in a changing climate, knitting the right to belong together with 
something else than soil is perhaps the most sustainable solution. Without a reconsideration of 
where to place the key to human rights instead of in territory, it will indeed ‘[…] not only [be] 
species that [become] extinct but also the words, phrases and gestures of human solidarity’ 
(Guattari, 1989/2000:43-44). The grim condition of statelessness tells the tale about how these 
reconsiderations should be made before and not after states begin turning uninhabitable (see 
Biermann and Boas, 2010). Although some territorial nation states may soon be beyond saving, 
human solidarity should not necessarily have to be. However, the way in which human rights, 
territories and nation states have been intertwined in a process neither beginning nor ending 
with the Peace of Westphalia, the creation of United Nations or any other single event suggests 
that it is not enough to re-define nationality in an international covenant or by adding a 
paragraph to the Statelessness conventions. Rather, nature has begun calling for an entire 
restructuring of the current and becoming. If international law is to be sustainable seen from 
the entire spectra of ecologies affecting human life, it is going to have to adapt to winds of 
change, melting ice and rising seas. The nationality principles currently in place are highly 
counterproductive in relation to such aim, as they are some of the most nightmarish customs 
seen from a solidarity perspective yet possibly some of the most complex customs unlikely to 
change overnight. This is because they serve the purpose of the homogenous and territorial 
nation state; a perplexing artificial creature born and bred by humans beings themselves. 
Possibly, the answer therefore lies at the heart of the rights(less) is observing as the source of 
its rights; nation state territory. A post-national approach and the exchange of nationality as the 
enabler of other entitlements is perhaps the solution to this nightmare (see e.g. Habermas, 1995; 
Agamben, 2000: Tonkiss, 2017). After all, the nation state is a peculiar idea which could be 
replaced by another one, not only in theory. 
 
Many stones are left unturned as the reader reaches the end of this paper. Nationality has 
multiple dimensions and many of them deserve more attention in research, from lawyers, 
politicians, organisations and other agents within the international society. Nationality’s 
importance as an determinant of identity in migration law, the provider of a sense of belonging 
and the conservator of cultural legacies are for example important angles which have not been 
given attention here. The distinction between and meaning of de jure and de facto climatic 
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stateless in light of the nationality law principles has not been scrutinised either. Thus, 
sociocultural bonds, differences in positions among stateless and the multiple practical usages 
of nationality in diverse legal areas combined with this reading of ius soli and ius sanguinis are 
prospective paths to walk down. So are also alternative conceptions of territory, its 
substitutions in a changing climate and the unavoidable question of praxeological solutions to 
a large-scale future climatic statelessness. In other words, there is much more to explore 
regarding the perplexing, soil-centred ‘nationality’.  
 
4.5. Conclusion 
Let us return to the world we imagined in the very beginning. What I have sought to underline 
throughout this paper is a number of notions and how they stand in relation to that world contra 
our one. Firstly, the autonomy of the nation state and human rights among people of the 
imagined world are ideas which have come to permeate international law here too. Whilst the 
ideal and sought-after outcome may be identical in both places, in this world we have come to 
fail in generating universality and equality among subjects. I have suggested that this has to do 
with the paradoxical nation state hypothesis and the inherent contradiction between territorial 
particularity and ethical universalism. Although there are countless of examples of alienation, 
inequality and disproportion exposing such failure, the focus here has been to accentuate how 
the application of nationality law principles in concoction with climate change create inequality 
and the condition of both place- and rightlessness. In other words, climatic statelessness 
illustrates how neither Earth’s resources nor UDHR’s provisions are distributed equally 
amongst everyone. The ‘if something were to happen to the climate-scenario’ in the imaginary 
world has further been stressed as a ‘when-scenario’ here due to the sea level rise. Even though 
larger industrial states emit substantially more carbon dioxide than SIDS, the latter are 
disproportionately affected by the climate change it generates. In the best of worlds, a loss of 
territory due to such changes would mean that these people could move freely elsewhere. The 
nationality law principles ius soli and ius sanguinis refutes that such freedom exists in this 
world. The principles are manifestations of how difference rather than sameness is maintained. 
As they unreflexively reference to soil as the key to access nationality, populations from SIDS 
on low altitudes are facing a future-unknown as their soils are beginning to vanish.  
 
To summarise, the second chapter of this paper provided the reader with explanations of 
Western conceptualisations of the nation state, human rights and the ways constructed to access 
them. These have now become part of customary international law in the form of nationality 
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law principles. The chapter also described the phenomenon of statelessness and how inclusions 
and exclusions to the nation state due its construction have given room for statelessness to 
emerge. By highlighting these concepts and explaining them in closer detail, the research 
question of what concepts are intertwined with ius soli and ius sanguinis was answered. This 
legal and conceptual mapping was provided in order to underline how the international order 
is built upon social constructions rather than anything static, inalienable and universal although 
international law gives no hints of such relativeness. The third chapter continued to contradict 
any notions of perpetuity by presenting scientific evidence that the very territory to which 
nation states, human rights in general and nationality in specific have been tied to risk vanishing 
in the near future due to sea level rise. A subsequent question raised in the chapter was whether 
or not the current construction of the nation state could endure without territory, population 
and the other criteria in the Montevideo Convention which defines what a state is. 
 
After exploring the legal-, historical- and political examples (or rather accentuating the lack 
thereof) of nation states enduring as such despite lacking inhabitable space, the image of 
territory as the sovereign’s physical body and a revisit to the notion of the nation state as an 
artificial (hu)man suggested to the reader that the loss of territory would mean the loss of 
statehood in the contemporary and prevailing order. The fourth and last chapter then turned the 
attention to what may happen to the subjects of such nation state-no-more. The first part of the 
chapter provided the reader with the case study of the Bikini Island to illustrate how ius soli as 
a principle of nationality law is an uncertain source of nationality in the case Marshall Islands 
were to sink. A subsequent part suggested that ius sanguinis function very similarly and the 
example of the Swedish Alien Act was used to illustrate this. Both principles were described 
as becoming particularly troublesome for both the sinking nation state and the climatic migrant 
for several reasons. Firstly, they were underlined as being deeply intertwined with the nation 
state whose continued autonomy is highly questionable if it stops meeting the Montevideo 
criteria of territory. Secondly, they were argued to become problematic for the observable 
reason that the option of returning or referencing one’s belonging to a physically present nation 
state would have become difficult if not even impossible. In the attempt of explaining where 
this dysfunction stems from and to advance the argument further, a post-structural reasoning 
concerning how territory may be understood brought light to its multidimensionality, relativity 




This revealed territory as highly complex and abstract despite its physical traits; although it 
historically and legally seems to have been perceived solely as a material given. Ius soli and 
ius sanguinis were argued to be clear manifestations of this unreflexive assumption, as they tie 
the very important (from both a nation state- and individual perspective) right to a nationality 
to physical soil exclusively. Since climate change makes territory’s relativity increasingly 
tangible, I concluded the paper by suggesting that if human rights are to remain purposive it 
makes little sense to ignore the environmental spectra of human life in the construction of 
principles fundamental both the nation state and the individual as rights subjects. This argument 
took the reader back to what was discussed chapter two; where human rights and the nation 
state were argued to be intertwined. Consequently, the paper could be said to end where it also 
began. This hopefully elucidated the impossibility of detaching oneself from the structure one 
is in yet the importance of always attempting to do so. The climatic stateless person reminds 
us of why. 
[…] 
But as years go by 
we wonder why 
the shoreline is not the same. 
The things we knew 
as always true 
somehow do not remain. 
The breakers break on higher ground 
the outer palms are falling down. 
The taro pits begin to die 
and the village elders wonder why. 
[...] 
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